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ABSTRACT 
Vietnam started a renewal process named “Doi moi” in 1986 to liberalize its 
economy and improve its status in the world. This process has resulted in the coun-
try’s fast economic development with GDP growth of between 6 and 8 per cent in 
recent years.  
However, the rapid economic progress and social changes have brought about 
corruption, threatening the country’s growth and sustainability. Top leaders have 
therefore declared corruption as a national threat. Before the year of 2010, just two 
corruption scandals were reported. During the current period of 2010-2014, more 
than 10 corruption scandals have been investigated, revealed and reported in the 
mass media. Of them, 5 key scandals will be discussed. This thesis seeks to explore 
the central question: “Is Vietnam democratizing, and, if so, does the democratic 
transition explain the increasing number of corruption scandals today in the coun-
try?” The thesis starts with the political base to look into the origins of the issue. 
The thesis examines aspects of democracy, democratization, corruption and 
media described by scholars and then studies whether the country is really in a de-
mocratization process and whether there is a relationship between democratization, 
press freedom and perceptions of corruption. Reported corruption scandals between 
2010 and 2014, surveys and reports on corruptions by local and international NGOs 
and newspapers will be analyzed. 
The thesis concludes that Vietnam is now democratizing with successes in 
mitigation of oppression and amplification of civil liberties, while in the nation’s 
government this process has seen a growing schism among top-ranking leaders. In 
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particular, it is this democratization that reduces the levels of perceptions of cor-
ruption. This finding is totally different from previous findings made for other de-
mocratizing countries. The thesis also reveals that the democratic transition in Vi-
etnam has increased press freedom. Vietnamese media now enjoy the right to spread 
news and information although some international watchdogs insist that the gov-
ernment is overly censoring the media. In turn, higher levels of press freedom, cre-
ated by more democratization, heighten the number of corruption scandals revealed. 
The thesis concludes that there are causal relations between democratization, per-
ceptions of corruption, press freedom and the number of corruption scandals in Vi-
etnam. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Vietnam became an independent state and reunified the North and the South 
in 1975 after 30 years of war against France and the US. After the military chal-
lenges ended, the new government, which was established in 1976, subsidized Vi-
etnam’s economy and did not allow free trade. In 1986, the country initiated its 
“Doi Moi” (renovation) process to liberalize its economy and raise its political 
status in the world (“30 Năm Đổi Mới”, 2014). The country’s GDP increased by 
8.2 per cent five years later the process (“30 Năm Đổi Mới”, 2014). However, the 
economic development that has been going at full gallop since 1986 has brought 
about high levels of corruption, threatening the country’s sustainability and 
growth (Martini & Transparency International, 2012). Top leaders have mobilized 
efforts to seek effective solutions to the spread of corruption in the government, 
agencies, companies and organizations. Before the year 2010, there were only two 
corruption scandals reported. Nevertheless, in the current period, 2010-2014, 
more than 10 major corruption scandals have been investigated and reported in the 
mass media. Of them, five scandals will be discussed. The key question of this re-
search: “Is Vietnam democratizing, and, if so, does the democratic transition ex-
plain the increasing number of corruption scandals today in the country?” 
According to Friedrich (1972), everyone including power-holders can be in-
volved in corruption. Corrupt behavior is a type of conduct deviating from ac-
cepted social norms in order to extract personal gain for public officials. Lord Ac-
ton (Friedrich, 1972) defines corruption as a form of vote buying, payoffs and 
kickbacks, among others, that aims to affect the decisions of the people who work 
in state bodies and organizations.  
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Regarding politics, the country has undergone major changes. According to 
Thayer (2009), Vietnam is now undergoing political liberalization. From the 
standpoint of well-known scholars such as Diamond, Stepan, and Schneider, liber-
alization is the first step of the democratization process. Democratization is differ-
ent from democracy because it is not a political system but a political process that 
aims at replacing a current political system with a democratic system (Rummel, 
1996). Meanwhile, Rock (2009) contends that during the democratization process, 
a state will suffer from the greatest perceptions of corruption.  
1. Rationale of the study 
To answer the key question, four hypotheses will be tested to explore 
whether Vietnam is democratizing and if yes, whether perceptions of corruption in 
Vietnam have increased during democratization, whether democratization creates 
more press freedom in Vietnam, and as a result, whether more press freedom 
raises the number of corruption scandals.  
Hypothesis 1: Vietnam is democratizing. 
Hypothesis 2: Democratization heightens levels of perceived corruption. 
Hypothesis 3: Democratization in Vietnam increases press freedom. 
Hypothesis 4: Higher levels of press freedom explains an increase in the 
number of corruption scandals. 
According to Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index, 
Vietnam ranks around 160th out of 180. Furthermore, the country has been listed 
as a non-democratic country (Freedom in the World, n.d., para. 5) or as an author-
itarian country (Gainsborough, 2002; Thayer, City University of Hong Kong, & 
Southeast Asia Research Centre, 2012). However, Vietnam has recently experi-
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enced political change. The country is apparently in the process of democratiza-
tion. According to Rose-Ackerman (1999), government corruption can be ex-
pected to increase during democratization. Countries that have recently emerged 
from authoritarian or totalitarian regimes tend to be affected by growing corrup-
tion and “money politics” (Moran, 2001). Meanwhile, Vietnam enjoys press free-
dom that has a major role in revealing criminal behaviors. An increase in corrup-
tion scandals has recently been reported in the media. This thesis will explore 
whether there are causal relations between democratization in Vietnam, press 
freedom and an increase of corruption scandals and whether democratization in-
creases perceptions of corruption. The central hypothesis is: Higher levels of press 
freedom, brought about by democratization in Vietnam have contributed to an in-
crease in the number of corruption scandals.   
2. Importance of the study 
The thesis aims to explore the question: Is there a linear relationship among 
democratization, press freedom and corruption in a democratizing country like Vi-
etnam? Moreover, the thesis will propose feasible solutions to the apparently 
growing problem of corruption in the country. It is hoped the findings can become 
a source for domestic and international politics researchers and agencies investi-
gating corruption in the country. 
3. Objectives of the study 
The objectives of this research are as follows: 
To examine why Vietnam is democratizing; 
To examine the influence of the democratization process on corruption and 
anti-corruption; 
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To explore the relationship between democratization and the domestic me-
dia with regards to reporting on corruption; 
To study the relationship between press freedom and corruption scandals; 
4. Methodology  
The first part of the research will discuss the concepts of democracy, de-
mocratization, the differences between democracy and democratization, defini-
tions of corruption and corruption scandals and the causes of corruption, and the 
nature of the media, and press freedom. In so doing, aspects of democracy, de-
mocratization, corruption and the media described by various scholars, such as 
Schneider and Ingram (1997), Clemons and McBeth (2009), Rummel (1999), 
Johnston (1999), Schneider and Schmitter (2004), Diamond (1999), Linz and Ste-
pan (1996), O’Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead (1986), Mainwaring and 
O’Donnell (1992), Kaufman (1986), Chalmers and Robinson (1982) and Przewor-
ski (1986), Friedrich (1972), Girling (1997), Bahur and Nasiritousi (2011), Hei-
denheimer (2009), and Zirker (2014) will be compared and analyzed. The second 
part of the research is to examine the first hypothesis, that Vietnam is democratiz-
ing, and whether the second hypothesis regarding the relationship between de-
mocratization and perceptions of corruption are useful insights into in the case of 
Vietnam. The third part of the research is to study the third hypothesis, that de-
mocratization in Vietnam enhances press freedom, and the fourth hypothesis, that 
higher levels of press freedom increase the number of corruption scandals. Re-
ported corruption scandals in Vietnam between 2010 and 2014 will be analyzed to 
answer the question as to whether democratization contributes to a reduction in 
levels of corruption, or has little or no effect. Surveys, reports and investigative 
articles on corruption from local newspapers, and local NGOs, Freedom House 
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(FH), Reporters without Borders (RSF), Bertelsmann Stiftung, the World Bank, 
Transparency International (TI), and the Vietnamese Government Inspectorate 
will be analyzed. 
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CHAPTER 2: Concepts of democracy, democratization, 
media and corruption 
2.1. Democracy 
Democracy is a form of government that allows eligible citizens to partici-
pate equally in elections to vote for their representatives who hold different gov-
ernment positions, and to have an equal say in the proposal, development, and 
creation of laws and decisions that affect their lives (Schneider & Ingram, 1997). 
Democracy, according to many specialists, offers citizens the right to freely ex-
press their opinions and feelings, urge political leaders to do what they consider to 
be good for the country, and to live without oppression nor under a dictatorship 
(Schneider & Ingram, 1997). It also brings about changes in the political system 
and renders obsolete constitutions that do not help reach solutions to systematic 
problems (Lipset, 1959). 
Democracy is derived from the word “Demokratia” (ancient Greek), mean-
ing rule by the people, or “dēmos”. “Rule by the people” in fifth century BC Ath-
ens, applied to men aged over 18, but not to slaves, women and non-citizens. 
These “citizens” participated in governmental affairs and directly controlled the 
decision making process. The form of democracy at that time was called direct de-
mocracy (Clemons & McBeth, 2009). 
Today, most democratic countries no longer have direct democracy, with 
the possible exception of parts of Switzerland. Instead, there are various forms of 
democracies, such as anticipatory democracy, representative democracy, liberal 
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democracy and participatory democracy. At present, liberal democracy has be-
come the most popular trend, and is seen as the best regime amongst different 
sorts of democracies. Rummel (1999) defines liberal democracy as a comprehen-
sive system which allows the existence of regular elections for the most powerful 
government positions, competitive political parties, secret balloting, near univer-
sal franchise, civil liberties and political rights and human rights. According to 
2012’s FH Report, there were 87 liberal democracies in 2011, accounting for half 
of the total number of countries (Puddington, 2012). 
Mainwaring and O’Donnell (1992) add that a democracy must satisfy three 
sets of fundamental criteria. First, political and legislative positions must be 
achieved via competitive elections. The results of democratic elections cannot be 
based on fraud and intimidation. Second, near universal suffrage must exist. This 
means that some people including criminals, mentally ill persons or people in mil-
itary forces may be listed as exclusions from suffrage. However, Mainwaring 
(1992) points out that those possibly excluded may be, in many cases, great in num-
ber so that their exclusion might impair the legitimacy of broad adult suffrage. Ad-
ditionally, such a regime may no longer be democratic, partly because sympathy 
for exclusions has declined over time. Finally, either civil liberties or minority 
rights must be safeguarded. 
2.2. Democratization 
Many people are confused about the distinction between democracy and de-
mocratization. As Rummel asserts, democracy should be seen as a political sys-
tem while democratization is only the political process which aims at replacing a 
current political system with a democratic system (Rummel, 1996). 
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Democratization is described by Moran (2001) as a process with “the vote 
as a basis for constitutional mechanisms for the transfer of power; political com-
petition through parties; guaranteed individual liberties; freedom to form public 
organizations and private organizations” (p.379). 
The condition for democratization, according to Dankwart Rustow, depends 
on the relation between democracy and other factors (Huntington, 1984). The fac-
tors might include economic, social, cultural, psychological and political ele-
ments. Johnston (1999) asserts that democratization is a work in progress com-
prising two steps. The first step is transition in which an existing regime is over-
thrown, loses its authority by votes, or even disintegrates. The second step is con-
solidation in which “leaders and primary political groups of the new system seek 
to deepen its base of social support, demonstrate its (and their own) effectiveness, 
and establish it as the only acceptable arena for advocating interests, resolving 
disputes, and making policy” (Johnston, 1999, p.9).  
Other specialists, such as Schneider and Schmitter (2004), Diamond (1999), 
Linz and Stepan (1996) and O’Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead (1986), view 
democratization as a process with three stages: liberalization of authoritarian sys-
tems, transition to democracy, and consolidation of democracy. Liberalization, the 
first process of democratization, is inevitable. Mainwaring and O’Donnell (1992) 
claim that liberalization refers to an escape from despotism and to an increase in 
civil liberties under authoritarian regimes. Liberalization, according to O’Donnell 
and Schmitter (1986), revolves around the mitigation of oppression and amplifica-
tion of civil liberties within an authoritarian regime. The rupture between mem-
bers of the authoritarian regime is also seen as an explanation for the appearance 
of liberalization (Kaufman, 1986; O’Donnell & Schmitter, 1986; Chalmers & 
Robinson, 1982; Przeworski, 1986). Chalmers and Robinson (1982) explain that a 
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liberal regime, in the viewpoint of authoritarian leaders, may be a necessary step 
for maintaining their authority, while Stepan (1988) contends that the emergence 
of liberalization often stems from the fiascos of an authoritarian state which lead 
to ruptures among state leaders or from consecutive successes which make leaders 
more open and less conscious of losing their legitimacy. The case of Argentina 
during the period between 1969 and 1973 illustrates that the conduct of liberaliza-
tion may have been the only way to overcome the drawbacks of Argentina’s au-
thoritarian regime. Mainwaring (1992) adds that outsiders of an authoritarian re-
gime in many cases have influence over liberalization despite the fact that current 
regimes remain stable. In response to those actors, some insiders will undermine 
the process. 
 O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986) think that authoritarian leaders opt for lib-
eralization to form an alliance with the opposition by putting forward liberalized 
rights and amended laws. This aims to re-legitimize the existing authoritarian re-
gime and forestall drastic change or replacement. In fact, many non-authoritarian 
actors take advantage of this situation to exert influence over the newly opening 
political processes or even end the existence of the regime, rather than liberalize 
it. They make use of freedom of expression brought about by liberalization to dis-
card current regulations. With confidence in maintaining power through liberali-
zation and gaining support from alliances, the authoritarian leaders consent to the 
holding of elections. As a rule, many authoritarian rulers have received limited 
support and are ultimately toppled by a new democratic regime (O’Donnell & 
Mainwaring, 1992).   
Przeworski (1986) and Bova (1991) take a different notion from the views 
of O’Donnell and Schimitter (1986) and O’Donnell and Mainwaring (1992). They 
 10 
examine Eastern Europe in showing that some authoritarian leaders, known as lib-
eralizers within the authoritarian regime, look for and form an alliance with con-
servatives because of emerging social unrest. At the same time, cleavages among 
authoritarian leaders also embolden social actors to operate in an independent 
way. These specialists contend that the “perception of political alternatives” rather 
than the idea of changing the existing authoritarian governments prompt social 
forces to accept it. Accordingly, the new alliance may start building up democratic 
institutions and allow those authoritarian groups to preserve social order (re-
stricted democracy). 
Przeworski (1992) and Mainwaring and O’Donnell (1992) discuss condi-
tions for a liberalized country to make the transition to a democratic state. Main-
waring asserts that the transition requires three prerequisites. First, authoritarian 
political systems must have dialogues with their opposition to sort out their differ-
ences. Second, cleavages between governmental officials are crucial. Third, each 
transition process must have its own unique feature because there is no typical 
transition model. Przeworski asserts that liberalization must be a process directed 
by authoritarian leaders.  
However, both articles suggest the possibility that a liberalizing country 
might not be able to transit into a democratic one. According to Przeworski 
(1992), if a mass movement carried out by autonomous organizations proves that 
liberalization is not a good strategy to earn legitimacy, and threatens authoritarian 
values, liberalization might lead it back to its previous authoritarian regime. Some 
forces will take that chance to block liberalization and herald the return of the au-
thoritarian regime (Mainwaring & O’Donnell, 1992). In Poland, during the period 
between 1955 and 1957, the liberalization process ended, and the state returned to 
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an authoritarian regime because of the integration of Workers-Councils (autono-
mous organizations) into the authoritarian regime and the repression of students 
by the regime (Przeworski, 1992). O’Donnell (1979a) states the reason for the 
failure of democratization in some countries is that actors of the opposition want 
to maximize their interests without being open to negotiation with authoritarian 
regimes (as cited in Mainwaring, 1992). Chile in 1988 is a typical example of that 
failure. 
In the final stage of the transition to democracy, Johnston (1999) argues that 
the consolidation of a democracy is often a very long and difficult period, in 
which the new democratic system, its political leaders and groups not only operate 
society and issue regulations based on the majority, but also affirm that there is no 
alternative political system better than the new developing democracy. A consoli-
dated democracy refers either to a supportable democratic system, or to an effec-
tive involvement in the development of society. A changeover to a market econ-
omy or endeavors to implement the reformation of backward market institutions is 
key to the assessment of a democratic regime. 
Linz and Stepan (1996, p.6) described consolidated democracy as a circumstance 
When no significant national, social, economic, political or institutional actors 
spend significant resources attempting to achieve their objectives by creating a 
nondemocratic regime or turning to violence or foreign intervention to secede 
from the state; … when a strong majority of public opinion holds the belief 
that democratic procedures and institutions are the most appropriate way to 
govern collective life; ... (and) when governmental and nongovernmental 
forces alike…become subjected to and habituated to, the resolution of conflict 
within the specific laws, procedures, and institutions sanctioned by the new 
democratic process.  
 
Diamond (1999) argues that to ensure that a democracy is consolidated, 
democratic actors must reach a consensus that there are no alternative political 
forms better than democracy. Those actors, accordingly, are forbidden from using 
physical force and are obliged to comply with democratic regulations. Conditions 
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for consolidation of democracy also require democracy and its assets to be revered 
as legitimate values by political and social institutions, and must not be toppled by 
any power. Like democratic actors’ consensus, support from the populace is nec-
essary for the legitimacy of pre-consolidated democracy. The consolidation might 
become valid and certain only if democracy acts as the unique system that dodges 
the use of physical force, as well as fraudulent, anti-constitutional and anti-demo-
cratic activity (Diamond, 1999). 
Linz and Stepan (1996) contend that the exclusive right of the use of force 
can ensure democracy is consolidated. Additionally, five interrelated spheres are: 
a free civil community, rule of law, a fairly self-governing and valued political so-
ciety, an efficient state-owned civil service, and a regimented economic society, 
all of which are accountable “to reinforce one another” (Linz & Stepan, 1996, p.7, 
p.9). 
O’Donnell (1992) assumes that to approach consolidated democracy, the au-
thoritarian must be balanced out by segregating him/her from politics and convert-
ing him/her to fractions or cults which are unable to pose a danger to the new de-
mocracy. Additionally, democratic actors should either foster practices which are 
necessary steps for the transition to a fully-developed democracy and persuade 
anti-democratic actors to grasp the fact that the democratic regime will be the best 
and safest regime among alternative political regimes (Weber, 1970). Next, an in-
crease in the number of democratic actors must be encouraged. Finally, demo-
cratic actors must take to the notion that the majority must be the key to national 
decision making.  
To become consolidated, democracy depends upon democratic actors who 
must build up institutions based on the mediation of interests, identities and con-
flicts. Furthermore, democratic actors should remember that even while they may 
 13 
be heterogeneous in interests and ethnicity or may compete among themselves for 
positions through elections, they are still in political alliance and ready to combat 
against their authoritarian actors who are waiting for the chance to bring back the 
authoritarian regime. During the consolidation process, they should seek to avoid 
the return of authoritarianism by trying to delimit the set of properly democratic 
actors. They should co-operate on certain acts and omissions as a way of reducing 
the danger of an authoritarian regression.  
2.3. Corruption 
2.3.1. Defining corruption 
Corruption has been prevalent since states started establishing social orders 
and classes. However, “any attempt to analyze the concept of corruption must 
contend with the fact that in English and other languages, the word corruption has 
a history of vastly different meanings and connotations” (Friedrich, 1972, p.3). 
Corruption is expressed variously in different contexts and different periods of 
time. According to Friedrich (1972), many classical politicians and philosophers 
defined corruption as a common disease of the political mechanism. To illustrate 
the point, he mentioned Machiaveli, who thought that corruption damages the vir-
tue of the people and only great leaders can heal the damaged virtue. Sharing the 
idea that corruption is a common disease, Rousseau (Friedrich, 1972) contends 
that political systems corrupt men and political corruption is the result of power 
struggles. He assumes that exemplary leadership, justice and good legislation 
could counter corruption. Meanwhile, Lord Acton (Friedrich, 1972) defines cor-
ruption as quite similar to intimidation; a product of absolute power. Corruption 
takes the form of vote buying, payoffs and kickbacks among others, and aims to 
affect the decisions of the people who work in state bodies and organizations. 
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However, corruption is described differently by Girling (1997) as conniving activ-
ities conducted by economic and political leaders who cause chaos to public order 
through three forms relevant to individual bribe taking for economic and political 
motives. In his definition, corruption happens not only in the field of politics but 
also in the economy. Personal attributes, restrictions and controls in a democracy 
can exert an influence on incentives to engage in corruption.  
Friedrich (1972) asserts that corruption is not solely confined to power hold-
ers - anyone can engage in corruption. He defines behavior which deviates from 
accepted social standards as corruption. In his view, corrupt behavior is often evi-
dent in any given context, for instance the political context, where people are mo-
tivated to be in charge of extracting “gain” at the public’s expense.  This gain 
might be either monetary or relate to jobs.  
Bahur and Nasiritousi (2011) divide corruption into two categories. The first 
category, “need-corruption”, is bribes, money paid by citizens to receive services 
that they are entitled to receive, while the second, “greed-corruption”, is a bribe 
paid by citizens with the aim of achieving advantages to which they are not le-
gally entitled. They explain that need-corruption is based on both cohesion and 
blackmail, while greed-corruption is brought about by collusion. 
Heidenheimer (2009) suggests a useful framework by distinguishing be-
tween “black, grey and white corruption.” “Black corruption” occurs with actions 
that a “majority consensus of both elite and mass opinion would condemn and 
would want to see punished,” while in the case of “grey corruption,” “some ele-
ments, usually elites, may want to see the actions punished, others not, and the 
majority may well be ambiguous” (Heidenheimer, 2009, p.152). Finally, in the 
case of “white corruption,” “the majority of elite and mass opinion probably 
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would not vigorously support an attempt to punish a form of corruption that they 
regard as tolerable” (Heidenheimer, 2009, p. 153). 
2.3.2. Corruption as an unavoidable phenomenon  
Girling (1997) asserts that corruption is an unavoidable practice. "It is a so-
cial problem: the product of economic, political, and cultural forces— that is, the 
way in which corruption is perceived and acted upon by members of society" 
(p.ix). He insists that all states that are democracies and even non-democracies 
face corruption. Corruption, according to Girling, follows three stages. First, the 
incompatible claims of economic and political systems: “this ‘structural’ incom-
patibility is reflected in the crucial political distinction between public and private 
spheres” (p.ix). Second, there is the need for the collusion between politicians and 
business people if they are about to overcome this incompatibility in order to 
make the system work. Collusion for such a purpose satisfies private interests. 
And corruption is the third stage, when private interests prevail. Corruption is the 
unavoidable result when the three stages come together. However, corruption 
plays various roles in different conditions. It can act as a functional factor (by ‘lu-
bricating’ an extremely strict political or bureaucratic regime) or more often as a 
dysfunctional weapon (by introducing an autocratic element into economic poli-
cymaking, stirring up popular outcry or eroding public confidence in democratic 
institutions). Rose-Ackerman (1999) adds that corruption is the outcome of eco-
nomic, cultural and political problems. 
Some people view the public sector, which has the potential to provide its 
employees with the prospect of gaining personal benefits, as a cause in triggering 
corruption. Economists take the view that state intervention that gives permission 
for bureaucrats and politicians to make their own rules and unfair decisions, 
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brings about corruption. Others assert that market mechanisms generate corrup-
tion. A great deal of recent research affirms that corruption is the outcome of a 
faulty governing system that is composed of weak legislation. 
Doyle (1983) explains that corruption is the nature of development and is 
derived from democratic states. Accordingly, in democratic countries, states have 
no business or rights within people’s private work. Exchanges of goods and edu-
cation take place among people of democratic states without government interven-
tion. A liberal zone in which mutual respect becomes a touchstone will then be 
formed among democracies. Such a zone with the exchanges of goods, education 
and culture sets up a mechanism for the world economy. Gould (2006) agrees 
with Doyle’s idea and adds that the global economy allows funds, products, tech-
nology and information to flow from one market to another without being ham-
pered by national or regional governments. The global interactions among democ-
racies spread out and dominate over non-democracies that then voluntarily be-
come members of this mechanism. However, in this mechanism, democratic and 
capitalist nations such as Canada, US, UK or Australia are the founders and devel-
opers. So, they not only own most transnational corporations but also pursue hold-
ing as much power of the global economy as possible. Their power and their mul-
tinational companies changed the world according to their own rules. As a result, 
corruption is still present. The global economy today has changed countries sig-
nificantly from how they used to be during the 1950s and 1960s, when every na-
tional economy had its own political and economic nuances. At that time, each of 
them took responsibility for exercising power, protecting their companies from 
foreign competition and ensuring their citizens’ rights. However, since the devel-
opment of global economic regulations, power has been handed over to multina-
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tional companies that are likely to make use of their investments to sway govern-
ments and consolidate their positions. Multinational enterprises threaten local 
economies that are dependent on their overseas sources to meet their demands. 
The more dependent on foreign investment a country becomes, the more power a 
multinational company has. Multinational companies with their investment 
choices in the global economy have started to use their power increasingly to ask 
governments for more rights which they did not have before. This gives rise to a 
potentially corrupt process whereby multinationals lobby for laws and rights that 
maximize their profits and ensure that they are priority stakeholders. 
2.3.3. Perceptions of corruption  
Estimating the level of corruption in a specific country has long been an 
awkward question, although it is still attracting the concerns of various scholars 
and policy analysts in the world. There are various methodologies aimed at calcu-
lating levels of corruption. Amongst them, Goel and Nelson (1998) were known 
for their approach after reaching the conclusion that the levels of corruption in a 
country might be estimated if the number of public officials involved in corrup-
tion cases in combination with accurate per head total spending of local authori-
ties were revealed. However, Lambsdorff (1999) explained that the increase in 
public spending on improving judiciary systems and personnel results in higher 
levels of conviction cases. So, conviction rates cannot indicate corruption levels 
but rather may reflect the quality of the judiciary. 
Tanzi and Davoodi (1997) and Olken (2009) all assert that the quality of in-
frastructure is a useful indicator in tallying levels of corruption. Tanzi and 
Davooli examined the quality of paved roads and power outages while Olken 
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made his own measure by calculating the real cost for a road project and survey-
ing the perceptions of corruption of villagers. Nonetheless, these measures could 
not generate an actual level of corruption due to either their lack of data or human 
biases.  
The difficulty in quantifying comparative corruption prompted economists 
and political scientists to “analyze indexes of perceived corruption prepared by 
business risk analysts and polling organizations, based on survey responses of 
businessmen and local residents” (Treisman, 2000, p.2). Those indexes contain 
less biases of a particular organization’s viewpoint. Of these studies, Lambsdorff 
(1999) devised a method of perceiving corruption based on collecting data, and 
interviewing businessmen who are said to directly encounter demands for kick-
backs, unusual gifts and so on. Lambsdorff’s Corruption Perception Index (CPI) is 
seen by many as the most appropriate tool for gauging corruption. Zirker, Gregory 
and Scrimgeour (2013) and Olken and Pande (2011) explained that the CPI is the 
result of a group of in-depth economics surveys undertaken in over 170 countries. 
The surveys target business people who are likely to grasp the context and subtl-
ties of corruption in their countries. Each of the surveys has some questions about 
corruption. All responses to those questions are put in a complex algorithm to de-
termine the corruption ranking of listed countries, from least to most corrupt. 
Transparency International (TI), established in 1993, is now present in more 
than 100 countries and conducts annual calculations of the CPI. The criteria in 
their surveys are based on Lambsdorff’s measurement method.  
2.3.4. Corruption Scandals  
The term corruption scandal has been increasingly used by Vietnam’s 
newspapers and news websites to describe allegedly corrupt activities. According 
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to Zirker (2014), scandals and corruption are closely related so they are nearly un-
identifiable from each other in the public’s thoughts. Lowi (1988, p.vii) defined 
scandal as “corruption revealed”, “breach of virtue exposed”, and “a useful exag-
geration of reality”. Lowi (1988, p.vii) explained the appearance of scandals in re-
ports or newspapers that “…the exposure of scandal, with all the leaks, formal in-
vestigations, and printed reports, provides outside observers with unusually good 
opportunities to get data on the internal political processes that are not routinely 
available.” Meanwhile, according to Zirker (2014, p.5), “scandals are public 
events, driven and formed by media, subject to the happenstance of image and 
‘fit’, and ultimately shaped by the biases and preconceptions of a largely inatten-
tive public.”  Zirker took the disclosure of key information and timing (including 
factors such as fairness and the response of the public to perceived “traps”) as two 
crucial origins of scandals. Waisbord (1994) in examining the role of the press in 
political scandals in Argentina notes that the study of scandals should focus on 
factors turning corrupt activities into public events or exposed in media, instead of 
reasons for the corruption. 
2.4. Defining free media  
The United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights states: “every-
one has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; the right includes freedom 
to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information 
and ideas through any media regardless of frontiers” (U. N. Charter art. 19, para. 
20). 
Supporting this statement, McQuail (2000) defines free media the rights to 
spread and expose news, information and viewpoints without being restrained by 
government. Also, media organizations should be allowed to disseminate news 
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and information through public channels while also managing their own business. 
The media should not be influenced by political considerations. More specifically, 
USAID (1999) defines media as free if editors are free from political biases and 
serve the interests of public audiences. It adds that the media helps strengthen de-
mocracy by establishing a host of plausible channels for raising voices. USAID 
concludes that autonomy in editing and financing as well as creating channels to 
give the public a voice are important in the establishment of a free and autono-
mous media.  
Rozumilowicz (2002) asserts that media is free or less free or not free de-
pending on who is the power holder. He also argues that only in a society where 
there is no power monopolization of social forces, government, business and indi-
viduals, can it be said that there is a free and autonomous media. That type of so-
ciety ensures fair and efficacious access to the media for every individual. A free 
media accordingly preserves factors such as competition and participation, which 
are said to be necessary for the democratization process.  
In Rozumilowicz’s definition, either market media or non-market media 
contributes to the freedom of the media. In the market-led media, business enter-
prises have freedom to advertise their products, PR managers have the right to 
spend money for their PR campaigns to attract public attention, and audiences can 
gain access to their favorite information and programs. The non-market led media 
are responsible for balancing the demands of the rest by establishing channels for 
discussions and talks in which a variety of people can be involved. 
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CHAPTER 3: Democratization in Vietnam  
Hypothesis 1: Vietnam is democratizing.  
This chapter analyzes the FH Index, Bertelsmann Stiftung’s Transformation 
Index (BTI) and Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGIs), which are considered 
to be the most popular indicators assessing the levels of democracy. The validity 
of the FH Index and WGIs on Vietnam will then be examined based on special-
ists' critiques. A brief examination of Russia and Rhodesia will be taken into ac-
count by way of comparing its evaluation with that of Vietnam. The results of 
WGIs’ methodology, in particular, will be examined, especially in context of that 
of the BTI. The BTI’s reports between 2010 and 2014 will form the basis of the 
argument that Vietnam is in democratic transition. Historical records and current 
events will also be examined. Vietnam has witnessed rupture, oppression and an 
amplification of civil liberties within an authoritarian regime, these appear to be 
signals of liberalization, and part of the democratization process.  
3.1. Democracy indicators and Vietnam’s democratization 
For the purpose of judging levels of democracy, at least 12 indexes have 
been developed by international organizations and specialists and used by democ-
racy-related scholars and researchers. The FH Index, BTI Index and WGIs are 
among the most respected and popular indicators assessing levels of democracy.  
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3.1.1. The Freedom House Index on Vietnam 
Of democracy indexes, the FH Index has been the most popular. As Gian-
none (2010, p.69) describes it, the FH Index is “the most used tool for measuring 
democracy” and covers most parts in the world. Lowenheim (2008) stresses that 
the FH index has been seen as a trustworthy apparatus thanks to the impression it 
gives as a neutral and rigid approach. According to FH’s 2014 edition, the index 
has measured 195 countries and 14 territories. It has been widely used and re-
ferred to by international organizations such as the United Nations and the World 
Bank, as well as specialists and media around the world. 
The index classifies countries as free, partly free or not free based on a 1 
(highest level of freedom) to 7 (lowest level of freedom) scale. The democratic 
levels of a country, according to the index, depend on its political rights and civil 
liberties. The levels are represented by scores, which are given by FH’s internal 
analysts, external analysts and academic advisers. The scores must derive from 
conditions and activities throughout the duration of the year. 
However, like many other international governance indicators, the FH’s in-
dex has been singled out for criticism since the 1970s. Many specialists have pre-
sented critiques of the index because of its alleged prejudice and lack of validity, 
while others assert that its research methodology cannot be applied in every coun-
try due to differences in economic, political and social structures. Merkel (2004) 
and Scoble and Wiseberg (1981) explain some of reasons for the critique of the 
methodology based on FH’s neglect of potential ideas regarding the improvement 
of measurement instruments. Lowenheim (2008) argues that the methodology fo-
cuses on examining weak states, whose scores are often low, and that it overlooks 
influential countries and actors that share the same problems with weak states. 
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Other specialists point out the shortcomings of FH’s reports by noting that the in-
dex is greatly influenced by the geopolitical interests which are the result of glob-
ally unequal communication (Giannone, 2010; Lowenheim, 2008; Scoble & 
Wiseberg, 1981). Giannone (2010) adds that the measurements carried out by FH 
ignore equality and are used as tools to raise international concerns about political 
conditions in certain parts of the world. Lowenheim (2008) argues that the index 
earns influential states’ power wielders by depersonalizing and decontextualizing 
their power, to generate an appearance of impartiality, and to reduce legitimate 
opposition to their authority” (Lowenheim, 2008, p. 268). 
Postcolonial specialists criticize FH because it is allegedly biased toward the 
rich countries which have good ties with the US, and does not address social and 
economic aspects but focuses on civil and political rights (Muzaffar, 1993; Cheah, 
2006; Rajagopal, 2006). Merkel (2004) and Scoble and Wiseberg (1981) add that 
FH neglects potential ideas about how to make effective measurement instru-
ments. According to Scoble and Wiseberg (1981), the FH index is designed to un-
derscore democracy in a theoretical way, and appears to have a prejudice in favor 
of the US political apparatus.  
The case of the election in Rhodesia: a biased observation from Freedom 
House 
In April 1979, the Smith regime, held an election in Rhodesia. FH proved its 
mission as a useful tool for a group of US senators who wanted to support that re-
gime through an election with the lifting of sanctions. While FH conveyed its con-
clusion that the Rhodesian election was “relatively free and fair”, and exhibited “a 
relatively free expression of the will of the people of Zimbabwe Rhodesia” (Her-
man & Brodhead, 1984, p.215), findings by observers from other countries, in-
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cluding Britain, were very different. Britain’s Lord Chitnis, for example, in his re-
port to the British Parliamentary Human Rights Group, concluded that the elec-
tion was “nothing more than a gigantic confidence trick”. Professor Claire Palley, 
in a report to the London-based Catholic Institute for International Relations, con-
cluded that “the election was neither fair nor free” (Herman & Brodhead, 1984, 
p.212).   
Although FH asserted that the election was “a relatively free expression of 
the will of the people,” it did not specify “what it was that the people were will-
ing”. FH also avoided examining certain details regarding how people viewed the 
election. In fact, black people in Rhodesia were asked to vote to fulfill their duty 
“in a patriarchal, tribal society with extensive dependency relationships as a ma-
nipulative and potentially coercive way to get people to vote” (Herman & Brod-
head, 1984, p.211). FH never mentioned this issue. The call to vote for peace by a 
regime aiming to pursue a civil war was disingenuous, and FH never commented 
on this issue. Regarding the likelihood of coercion, FH claimed that a large num-
ber of government military forces nationwide during the election period were mo-
bilized to prevent local ‘insurgents’ from jeopardizing the election (p.211).  
Observers’ from other countries were open with their use of facts on the 
ground and their analysis of the factors affecting the result of the election, while 
the FH report presented no facts and precise figures, except for its subjective com-
ments (Herman & Brodhead, 1984, p.214).  
The FH index is also prejudiced in favor of US allies and states that are 
friendly with the US (Scoble & Wiseberg, 1981), and is biased against communist 
countries (Mainwaring, Brinks, & Perez-Linan, 2001; Goldstein, 1986). Scoble 
and Wiseberg (1981) provide examples of US allies in Latin America as well as 
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Indonesia and pre-1979 Iran, and so on, known for political repression, to illus-
trate the point that being friends of the US will help a country to be considered as 
“partly free” or “free” by FH. In contrast, countries which possess ideologies 
completely different from that of the US will tend to be ranked “partly free” or 
even “not free”, and have lower scores from FH. Scoble and Wiseberg (1981) 
state:  
The discrepancies on Brazil and Cuba would seem the result not of instrument 
error but rather of observer error that, in this case, means the greater ideologi-
cal bias on the part of Freedom House and its surveys. Since successive US 
administrations have sought to build up Brazil as the continental surrogate for 
US interests and power in South America, Freedom House’s more favorable 
ratings on freedom in Brazil both reflect and justify official US Policy. We be-
lieve that this ideological bias results from the overlap in membership between 
the Freedom House Board of Trustees and the US government elite. For exam-
ple, the 1979 board of trustees included a significant number of individuals 
readily identified as having held high government positions, past or present 
(p.161). 
 
Bollen (1986) contends that the weaknesses of the FH index lie in humans’ 
limited intellectual abilities and human influences. By differentiating the data col-
lection process from the data analysis process, he detects errors entrenched in the 
index. Bollen asserts that unpredicted errors rather than individual intention are 
likely to occur due to input. Accordingly, errors might come from neglect on the 
part of information collectors, so collected information is always partial. Moreo-
ver, errors in the analysis process can occur because of human influences, Bollen 
adds. Human influences, he argues, always go with political orientation, and this 
decides or adjusts the final results of the ratings.  
The case of Russia: a biased rating from Freedom House 
Russia has been listed as a non-free country by FH for over two decades. 
Recently, the country was still defined as an authoritarian country by the organi-
zation. However, Russia with its policy of “managed democracy”, is for many 
specialists not a completely authoritarian state despite the fact that the country 
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keeps oppressing the opposition, centralizing its power, introducing new laws 
against unauthorized protests or being involved with human rights abuses in 
Chechnya and so on. Many of them regarded Russia as a semi-authoritarian coun-
try rather than a consolidated authoritarian state (Hale, 2010; Sakwa, 2011; Rob-
ertson, 2011). According to Robertson (2011), a hybrid regime guarantees the 
maintenance of power and still exacts profit yielded by political competitions. 
This means that the authorities do not hold complete power over the country, and 
thus that FH’s ratings are inaccurate. According to Polity IV, a well-known data 
source for assessing levels of democracy in independent states, Russia was an 
open anocracy in 2009 and 2011 (Marshall & Cole, 2009; Marshall & Cole, 
2011). On the other hand, Russia was listed as a hybrid regime in 2007 and 2010 
by the Economist Intelligence Unit. In 2011, Russia was regarded as an autocratic 
regime by FH. Also, the Political Atlas, based on an institutional analysis, con-
cluded that Russia is not an authoritarian regime; it already has a set of democratic 
institutions (Melville et al., 2010). 
Based upon the case of Russia, we can begin to see that the accuracy of FH 
is at least questionable. Tsygankov and Parker (2015) explain the reason for FH’s 
low score on Russia’s level of democracy based upon a US tendency towards eth-
nocentrism and the history between the US and Russia. Regarding historical mat-
ters, and the Cold War, Russia is supposedly still considered a threat rather than a 
friend. The two authors claim that national perceptions throughout US history 
have conditioned a sense of superiority of the US government. Accordingly, the 
US government expects other states (and Russia) to follow its institutional model. 
The US government, then, sees promoting democracy as one of its (albert, more 
casual) foreign policy aims, and wants other countries, especially Russia, a poten-
tial threat, to follow its lead. Listing Russia as a non-free country through the 
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FH’s reports is a way that the US can put pressure on Russia, and thereby influ-
ence its politics. 
The Case of Vietnam: a biased rating from Freedom House? 
Like Russia, Vietnam has been listed as a non-free country by FH since it 
was first rated on a scale of 1 to 7 by FH in 1999 (Freedom House, 1999). The 
communist country had the lowest score for civil liberties and political rights, 
which were all 7 in 1999. Until 2013, only small changes were recorded in Vi-
etnam’s grade. Specifically, Vietnam’s civil liberties scored 5, instead of 7 as in 
the past, while its political rights have remained at the score of 7, the lowest point 
since 1999 (Freedom House, 2013a). Thus, the improvement of civil liberties, ac-
cording to FH, is not sufficient for the country to be listed as partly free or a free 
country (non-democratic state). 
FH accuses Vietnam of lacking both political rights and civil liberties (Free-
dom House, 2014a). Accordingly, the organization categorizes Vietnam as a non-
electoral democracy. However, evidence suggests that Vietnam actually has had 
elections with the participation of Vietnamese citizens. According to Vietnam’s 
1992 Constitution, every citizen has equal influence via the National Assembly 
and the People’s Council, whose members are elected by people (Vietnam. Const. 
art 6, §1). Every citizen who is 18 or over has rights, and is eligible to go to the 
polls (Vietnam. Const. art 54, §5). 
FH criticizes Vietnam for its single-party system (Freedom House, 1999, 
2014a). It accuses the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) of controlling every 
institution, even the National Assembly. However, evidence again suggests that 
this is relatively unimportant because the public can exercise their rights and have 
a say regularly when election to the National Congress of the CPV takes place, 
every five years, and through National Assembly meetings that are held twice a 
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year. During the year, the Assembly considers drafts that are reviewed by special-
ists in related areas and then publicizes them on the National Assembly’s website 
and online media to receive the Vietnamese public’s feedback. There is abundant 
evidence that they listen closely, and respond positively, to this feedback. After 
referendum, drafts are adjusted before issuance, and if they still receive a substan-
tial amount of support from the people, they are passed. Or, if draft proposals do 
not, they are eliminated. It is easy to conclude from the evidence that decisions 
made by the National Assembly are not dominated by the CPV.  
In addition, Vietnam has been denounced for its constraints on religious 
freedom (Freedom House, 2010a, 2011a, 2012a, 2013a, 2014a). FH asserts that 
religious groups must ask for permission if they want to carry out their activities. 
It also emphasizes that the Roman Catholic Church must seek approval from the 
government if it appoints bishops or priests. In fact, FH’s accusations are inaccu-
rate. As the Government Committee for Religious Affairs, the body in charge of 
supervising religious groups in the country states, religious organizations are free 
to select their leaders and organize their activities (Van, 2013).  According to the 
committee, nearly 95 per cent of the population practiced their religious faith in 
2013 (Van, 2013). Van also reported that the country had 25,000 religious facili-
ties and 45 religious schools. Moreover, the number of religious organizations 
was 36 in 2013, twice as many as the figure in 2006. 
Furthermore, the low score can also be explained by insufficient infor-
mation collection and analysis on the part of by FH. Bollen (1986) suggests that 
FH lacks the necessary data to judge democratic levels and biases against leftist 
governments because of human-limited intellect or human influences. Based on 
the work of the scholars mentioned above and the dramatic changes in politics and 
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civil society in Vietnam, it can be concluded that FH’s democratic index on Vi-
etnam is weak. To analyze whether Vietnam is democratizing, we should turn to 
recent developments in the country. 
3.1.2. The World Bank’s Governance Indices on Vietnam 
Besides the work of FH, one of the most popular sets of indicators is the 
World Bank’s WGIs. The International Bank for Reconstruction and Develop-
ment and the International Development Association (also known as The World 
Bank), established in 1944 and with more than 120 offices worldwide, is a United 
Nations international financial institution that provides financial and technical as-
sistance to developing countries. According to its mission statement, it is not a 
bank in the ordinary sense but a unique partnership to reduce poverty and support 
development (The World Bank, n.d.). So, conducting surveys to measure the de-
velopment of these countries, including Vietnam, is one of its regular activities. 
In the 1990s, the World Bank statistics about good governance and policy 
implementation in states served as the main base to work out their economic sta-
tus and for considerations on aid to weaker economies. According to Burnside and 
Dollar (2000), international financial assistance was given to the countries that 
were implementing clear and coherent policies. The statistics were compiled from 
reports, responses and surveys from specialists, government officials, businesses 
and citizens. However, most of the data exposed its limitations. The opinion polls 
and assessments differed in their methodology and interpretation of terms, while 
questionnaires and measurement scales of responses also varied. According to the 
WGIs Project, aggregate indicators did not reflect the official views of the World 
Bank, its Executive Directors, or the countries they represent. These have not 
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been used by the World Bank Group to allocate resources or for any other official 
purpose any longer (Worldwide Governance Indicators, n.d.). 
In order to tackle these limitations, the World Bank created indicators that 
grade listed countries according to governing capability based on 340 variables of 
32 various sources (Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2008). The indicators assess 
the quality of governance in 212 states and territories. The creators of the WGIs 
claim that WGIs are currently more informative than any other data sources and 
are useful for computing the margin of error of the evaluated measure.  
WGIs include six components of Voice and Accountability, Political Stabil-
ity and Absence of Violence, Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, 
Rule of Law and Control of Corruption. Amongst these, the indicator of Voice 
and Accountability is a tool to assess the democratization process in a country. 
Nonetheless, Thomas (2010) asserts that the indicator of Voice and Accountabil-
ity relies on clustering variables made by unobserved governance constructs that 
lead to large margins of error that makes the estimates meaningless. Also, cluster-
ing decisions affects the rankings of countries.   
For example, the World Bank categorizes and averages four variables for 
two countries, referred to as Pink and Red, with scores for the range of Z1 to Z4 
to give their Voice and Accountability Indicator. The Pink country’s results are 
Z1 (6), Z2 (3), Z3 (11) and Z4 (3). The Red country gets Z1 (5), Z2 (3), Z3 (1) 
and Z4 (6). Higher numbers illustrate better governance. It is this indicator that 
the World Bank uses in its ranking for these two countries. In this case, the Pink 
country is better than the Red country because it is graded higher. The indicator of 
Voice and Accountability scores Pink 5.75 while Red receives 3.75.  With this re-
sult, Red ranks lower than Pink.  
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However, Thomas (2010) argues that different clustering decisions will cre-
ate different results. For example, four variables are grouped in three single 
groups to create two Voice and Accountability indicators (Indicator 1 and Indica-
tor 2). Group 1, Group 2 and Group 3 show three different results. It means that 
Voice and Accountability indicators for the Pink and Red countries will have dif-
ferent scores to their previous results. Similarly, the two countries will have dif-
ferent rankings. Thomas explains that the World Bank does not provide any ex-
planation or theoretical-based research for its grouping decisions. Thus, scores 
provided by the World Bank’s Voice and Accountability indicator and others ap-
pear to be biased and inaccurate.  
3.1.2.1. The World Bank’s Voice and Accountability Indicator on Vietnam during 
2004-2012 
Figure 3.1: Estimation of Voice and Accountability in Vietnam  
 
Source: Worldwide Governance Indicators. Retrieved January 3, 2015 from http://databank.worldbank.org 
In figure 3.1, the organization states that Vietnam’s Voice and Accountabil-
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figure was raised a little bit to -1.4 in the year of 2011 and showed no change in 
2012. As from the research mentioned above, the World Bank’s indicators might 
be biased or inaccurate because they are not based on any definitive theory or ex-
planation. Thus, its indicators on Vietnam’s Voice and Accountability appear to 
be invalid.  
3.1.3. Bertelsmann Stiftung’s Transformation Index on Vietnam 
The Bertelsmann Stiftung Transformation Index (BTI) has been seen by 
some as an objective and popular means of assessing quality of democracy and 
market economies in 129 countries since its first appearance in 2003. The BTI an-
alyzes the progress, development and transformation in these countries. The BTI 
is composed of two elements: a Status Index and a Management Index (Bertels-
mann Stiftung, 2008). In the Status Index, democracy and the market economy are 
the two elements evaluated. In the Management Index, the BTI examines political 
leadership and governance. The German government’s governance criteria have 
been based on criteria set by the BTI. The United Kingdom has used the BTI to 
consider countries in need of financial support. The World Bank’s Governance In-
dicators and TI’s Corruption Perceptions Index use the BTI’s standards to evalu-
ate accountability and corruption. The BTI also acts as a governmental apparatus 
to carry out critical policy analysis and helps develop the Community of Democ-
racies  (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2008). 
Civil rights, rule of law and governance effectiveness are the assessed com-
ponents of the BTI. Based on collected data, there have been few of critiques of 
the BTI. The BTI’s weaknesses or oversights might be determined in the future, 
but at present it is regarded as one of the reliable and valid sources for researchers 
and institutions.  
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3.1.3.1. The BTI score for Vietnam 
All the reports made by the BTI before 2007 concluded that there was no 
democratic transition in Vietnam. However, the BTI’s 2010 report started ac-
knowledging the foundation for this transition process in the country (Bertels-
mann Stiftung, 2009). Specifically, the report affirmed that the Vietnamese gov-
ernment started discussing a draft report that allows citizens to be involved in po-
litical issues. Moreover, National Assembly deputies have since then been em-
powered to select nominees for the Central Committee. The National Assembly, 
supposedly the supreme institution representing the will of the people and peo-
ple’s rights, has a greater impact on the state’s policy decisions, and thus is able to 
put pressure on the CPV’s officials to be more responsible. However, pro-democ-
racy reforms had yet to record significant progress due to the lack of the legisla-
ture’s supportive legislation (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2009). 
Thus, the 2010 BTI report states that the signs of political liberalization had 
not been clear in the country. However, this is different in the 2012 report. It notes 
that there seems to have been clear and appropriate signals of democratic transi-
tion (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2012). The National Assembly has publicized drafts 
of the strategies, plans and new policies that provide people with opportunities to 
contribute ideas regarding major issues concerning the country and enhancing the 
quality of the policy-making process before any official decisions are made. The 
report asserts that activities of associations and organizations have been permitted 
without restraint. The Vietnamese Government, moreover, began recognizing the 
term “mass organization” during this period as part of the definition of civil soci-
ety’s. The 2012 BTI report contends that mass organization is a decisive factor in-
fluencing the democratic transition in the country (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2012). It 
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reports that nearly 75 per cent of the Vietnamese population are members in at 
least one association while more than 60 per cent are a member of at least two or-
ganizations. These signals appear to indicate that Vietnam has begun its political 
liberalization. 
Table 3.1: Democratic Level in Vietnam from 2010 to 2014 
Status Index 2010 2012 2014 
Scores for Democracy/ Po-
litical Transformation 
3.30 3.50 3.57 
  Source: Bertelsmann Stiftung. Retrieved January 20, 2015 from http://www.bti-project.org/reports/country- 
reports 
In table 3.1, Vietnam scored 3.30 for its level of democracy in 2010 while 
the grade in 2012 increased to 3.50. There was a slight increase in Vietnam’s 
score in 2014 to nearly 3.60. The BTI’s reports between 2010 and 2014 illustrate 
the fact that during this period, Vietnam was democratizing. Thus, although being 
subjectively regarded as an authoritarian regime by FH or the World Bank, Vi-
etnam is ranked as a democratizing country by Bertelsmann Stiftung, an inde-
pendent organization.  
3.2. Historical basis for the democratization process in Vietnam 
Located in South East Asia, Vietnam has been greatly affected by Confu-
cian culture for a thousand years. According to Fukuyama (1995), the combina-
tion of capitalist and authoritarian systems elicits from most Asian countries polit-
ical institutions and the continuing existence of Confucian traditions. He also at-
taches importance to Confucianism in Asian political systems because of several 
other reasons. First, Confucianism previously applied fair examination systems to 
select talent based on merit, and now it provides people with unlimited opportuni-
ties to gain greater knowledge and seek good jobs. Second, Confucianism focuses 
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on education. The higher levels of education encourage people to understand the 
values of democracy and become more comfortable with strengthening demo-
cratic rules. Without education, people tend to have little capability of participat-
ing in the development of democracy. Finally, Confucianism encourages toler-
ance. Fukuyama contends Confucian tolerance is better than that of Islam or 
Christianity. 
It should be noted, however, due to consecutive events such as the wars 
against France and the US, that Confucianism has diminished influence in Vi-
etnam. The 17th century saw the shift from Vietnam’s Chinese-style written alpha-
bet, as to the Western Roman alphabet, as transcribed by a French Jesuit mission-
ary. The reduction in Confucian influence can be perceived after the country was 
overtaken by French colonization from 1885 to 1954, and a war against the US 
between 1955 and 1975. Marxism and nationalism gained major influence, espe-
cially during the anti-colonial resistance. After 1986 (and the renovation process), 
Vietnam started its trade liberalization, which earned it high GDP growth (over 8 
per cent in 2005). The historical records and events suggested that Vietnam has 
substantially changed and is now ready for further political development.  
3.3. Democratization in Vietnam 
3.3.1 Internal ruptures 
Vietnam’s political development can be seen in recent events. Mathieu 
Tromme, an anti-corruption specialist, describes it in the following terms: “This 
governability crisis is equally at play in Vietnam, where decentralization has also 
empowered local party chiefs. At the central level, the party is split between 
Prime Minister (PM), President, Party General Secretary and their respective aco-
lytes” (Tromme, 2012, p. 4). Moreover, on 11 June 2013, confidence votes, with 
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three degrees: high confidence, confidence and low confidence (no confidence), 
were, for the first time, carried out in the National Assembly (NA). Among the 
positions subject to the vote were the President, Vice President, Prime Minister, 
cabinet ministers and other high-ranking officials. These votes aimed to dismiss 
officials who had lost confidence, with the number of low confidence votes mak-
ing up 75 per cent of the total ballots, and those with low confidence votes mak-
ing up 50 per cent of ballots for two consecutive years. PM Nguyen Tan Dung 
had the third highest number of low confidence (no confidence) votes with 160 
ballots (32 per cent of the total number of ballots) (Vietnam’s National Assembly, 
2013). Meanwhile, State President Truong Tan Sang and NA chairman Nguyen 
Sinh Hung had the highest number of high confidence votes with 330 ballots each 
(nearly 70 per cent). The Party General Secretary was not subject to these votes. 
NA Chairman Nguyen Sinh Hung said that all of the officials had submitted re-
ports on their work performance and results during their time in office as the most 
important information sources for NA deputies to consider before the vote (Tin, 
2013). The current situation at the time of socio-economic development, security 
and national defense, international relations and justice were the other factors 
taken into account. Other sources of information to be considered before the vote 
were opinions and recommendations from voters nationwide. Hung argued that 
the result of the votes of confidence showed the real situation of the country. 
The low confidence votes for PM Nguyen Tan Dung can be explained due 
to recent incidents. First, his confidence was negatively affected by the corruption 
scandals in Vinalines and Vinashin, two giant state-owned corporations. Vinalines 
and Vinashin are two of the largest state-owned corporations (Vinalines, 2013; 
VOER, n.d.). Vinashin is the country’s largest shipbuilding firm; Vinalines is in 
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charge of all of the nation’s maritime activities. Both contributed to a VND92 tril-
lion (US$4.5 billion) deficit in the state budget (Bach, 2013). The PM was also 
blamed for the failure of the model of economic groups that was his initiative 
(VOER, n.d.). Vinashin and Vinalines belong to that model. A Vietnamese spe-
cialist adds that responsibility also fell on the PM because he had the authority to 
appoint staff members to the groups, and to approve their projects (“Luật Sư Nói”, 
2010).  
According to Vietnamese General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong in 2012, he 
and his party would punish a high-ranking official called “X” (explicitly Referring 
To The PM) due to his mismanagement of the economy (“Không Nêu Tên”, 
2012). However, due to unknown reasons, “X” did not receive any punishment 
from the General Secretary and the party, and the identity of the unnamed official 
was not revealed to the public. By exposing this mismanagement, the leader of the 
party received support from party members and followers. 
Last year, Nguyen Ba Thanh, chairman of central Da Nang city, was ap-
pointed as the head of the Central Internal Affairs Commission, a body in charge 
of preventing and fighting corruption, by General Secretary Trong. At the same 
time, PM Dung was removed from anti-corruption work. However, Thanh, was 
then accused of responsibility for a budget deficit of up to VND3.4 trillion 
(US$1.6 billion) for Da Nang City during his term as the city’s chairman (“Đà 
Nẵng Thất Thu”, 2013). This accusation was made by the Government Office, an 
organ assisting the PM and the government. At the same time there was tension 
over the South China Sea between Vietnam and China, and PM Dung criticized 
and actively opposed Chinese violation of Vietnam’s Exclusive Economic Zone, 
while the leader of the ruling party, Nguyen Phu Trong, and other members of the 
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Politburo did not raise concerns over the issue. These developments pointed to a 
critical rupture among the state’s high-ranking officials.  
Earlier, there were less visible ruptures among top leaders. Before the 11th 
National Congress of the CPV meeting in 2011, PM Nguyen Tan Dung was said 
to have been seeking a second tenure, while Truong Tan Sang, who was a member 
of the Politburo, was said to have been running for the position of the PM (Brown, 
2012). 
BBC described Dung as the most powerful politician in Vietnam (“Chân 
Dung Ông”, 2011). He was portrayed as a version of Singapore’s PM Lee Kuan 
Yew, who helped Singapore modernize and stamp out corruption. In Dung’s first 
tenure, Vietnam joined the World Trade Organization and boosted trade with the 
US. Meanwhile, Truong Tan Sang was described as the second most powerful 
person in the CPV, and in charge of the CPV’s daily affairs. According to Brown 
(2012), and in the eyes of many Vietnamese diplomats and ambassadors to Vi-
etnam, Sang is an innovative and ambitious leader and a senior party member. Af-
ter the CPV meeting in 2011, Dung remained as PM while Sang was reluctant to 
become the country’s president, a position that has no real power. As Brown 
(2012) notes, Sang failed in his competition with Dung. However, he formed a co-
alition with Nguyen Phu Trong, who was appointed to become the party’s General 
Secretary, with the aim of breaking the influence of PM Dung (“VN: Biên Độ”, 
2012). This contributed to Vietnam’s democratization after 2010. Ruptures of this 
kind, according to Kaufman (1986), O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986), Chalmers 
and Robinson (1982) and Przeworski (1986), begin liberalization, a key part of 
the democratization process. Liberalization, according to O’Donnell and 
Schmitter (1986), revolves around oppression mitigation and civil liberties ampli-
fication within an authoritarian regime.  
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3.3.2. Oppression mitigation 
Most of the oppression in Vietnam is concerned with political dissidents 
who have been seen to threaten single-party rule. The political dissidents in the 
country can be divided into two groups. The first group is involved with historical 
events including Vietnam’s wars against France and the US. After World War II, 
Vietnam was separated into two parts, the North and the South. The North was 
under the control of the communist faction while the South was ruled by Emperor 
Bao Dai who supported the French colonialist in the period between 1949 and 
1955. Then, between 1955 and 1975, the South was governed by Ngo Dinh Diem 
and Nguyen Van Thieu who were under the guidance of the US government. Dur-
ing this time, the US started invading Vietnam. The war against the US ended in 
1975, with all US military personnel and their followers expelled from Vietnam. 
Many Vietnamese who had supported the US in Vietnam and left the country as 
the US withdrew, ended up living in the US, where they set up their own parties 
or political organizations such as Viet Tan or Nguoi Viet. These groups aimed to 
overthrow the post-1975 Vietnamese government. These organizations received 
financial assistance from foreign governments. The second group, appearing in re-
cent years, includes bloggers who write stories aimed at bringing down the gov-
ernment; disseminate illegal information and host protest activities across the 
country that threaten social stability. All of their activities are conducted online. In 
reaction to this political activity and dissent, Vietnamese authorities have detained 
activists while alleging that they cause public disorder and disrupt the state sys-
tem.  
The Vietnamese government has exerted efforts to oppress these groups’ ac-
tivities, especially in 2010-2012. Some might argue that Vietnam is not democra-
tizing because the regime is still incarcerating political dissidents. It is reported 
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that over 200 dissidents were arrested during this period. According to many ob-
servers, the 11th National Congress of the CPV was the reason for the incarcera-
tion of these dissidents, and not a general trend towards more repression. At the 
meeting, the new General Secretary, National Assembly Chairman, President and 
Prime Minister were selected for five-year tenures. The selection of new cabinet 
members was thought to have convinced authorities to tighten security measures 
to maintain domestic order and prevent potential riots.  
However, since 2013, the government has mitigated their oppression of po-
litical dissidents and religions. This movement can be seen in the reduction of 
prison sentences and the granting of amnesty to political prisoners. For instance, 
the Thanh Nien Newspaper on May 16 published that Nguyen Phuong Uyen was 
sentenced to six years for spreading propaganda against the Vietnamese govern-
ment (Thanh, 2013) that threatened public security. However, after a court revi-
sion, she only received three-year probation (“Vietnam Reduces Dissidents”, 
2013). Dinh Nguyen Kha, another political dissident, received a four-year prison 
sentence instead of the initial eight-year sentence (“Vietnam Reduces Dissidents”, 
2013). Nguyen Huu Cau, who was arrested in 1982 and sentenced to life in 
prison, was freed in 2013 (“Tù Nhân Thế Kỷ”, 2014). Dinh Dang Dinh who was 
arrested in 2011 and sentenced to 6 years, was granted amnesty in 2013. In addi-
tion, Nguyen Tien Trung who was arrested in 2012 and sentenced to 5 years, was 
released in May 2014, and Vi Duc Hoi, who was sentenced to eight years in 
prison in 2011, was freed in April 2014 and is under house arrest for another 3 
years (“Thạc Sỹ Nguyễn”, 2014). Outspoken lawyer Cu Huy Ha Vu, who was 
sentenced to 7 years in prison and three years under house arrest in 2010, was 
freed in April 2014 (“VN Thả TS”, 2014). Dozens of political prisoners received 
reductions in prison sentences. At the same time, the number of registered 
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churches has increased dramatically. In 2013, nearly 120 churches were regis-
tered, a significant increase in comparison with the previous years (Van, 2013). 
Human Rights Watch explained that there were few registered churches estab-
lished in the country in the previous years because the Vietnamese government 
imposed complicated legislation and strict requirements for the registration of 
churches, as an oppression measure. 
Although some argue that efforts to mitigate oppression in Vietnam with the 
country’s signing of the United Nations Convention Against Torture have helped 
Vietnam reach a free trade agreement with the US (“2013 Human Rights”, 2014), 
there is abundant evidence that Vietnam was already becoming a less oppressive 
country several years before the prospect of a US trade pact.  
3.3.3. Civil liberty amplification  
Not only has oppression been lessened in Vietnam but civil society in the 
country has also been on the increase. According to the state-owned newspaper, 
People’s Army, the number of registered civil organizations in Vietnam is now 
around 6,400 (“Hiểu đúng về”, 2014). Theoretically, these organizations serve an 
important role in proposing new policies and criticizing and suggesting necessary 
amendments to current ineffective policies. Thayer (2009) adds that Vietnam’s 
improvement in its civil society can be observed through a dramatic increase in 
the number of non-registered civil associations in the past 10 years. This sort of 
civil society challenges the legitimacy of Vietnam’s one party government by crit-
icizing ineffective policies and corruption and pushing for freedom and human 
rights ensured in democratic states. In the year 2013, more than 20 organizations 
requested the Vietnamese National Assembly to temporarily stop the approval of 
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the draft revised Land Law (Nguyen, 2013). The organizations urged the assem-
bly to keep taking independent advice from international consultants into consid-
eration during the law’s amendment process. 
Thayer (2009) asserts that although these non-state civil associations are not 
recognized by the Vietnamese state, they are still bringing about changes in con-
temporary politics. With the encouragement of civil society, Vietnamese citizens 
and political activists between 2007 and 2014 have constantly demonstrated 
against Chinese violation of territory at sea claimed by Vietnam. The demonstra-
tions were supported by Vietnamese authorities despite the fact that all demon-
strations tended to be suppressed before 2012 (“Các Diễn Biến”, 2012). Civil so-
ciety directly speeds up the time-consuming process of provision of the law on 
demonstrations which used to be ignored by the CPV. The law is expected to be 
introduced at a National Assembly plenary session in 2015. Furthermore, Viet-
namese civil society has succeeded in forcing Vietnamese authorities to deliver 
the Land Law in 2013 after civil organizations and the media raised their concerns 
with the government (Land Law, 2013, V.N). They have described wrongful deci-
sions as threats to the stability of society. Violence in the port city of Hai Phong in 
2012 caused by illegal land confiscation is a good example to support of this 
viewpoint shared by civil associations in Vietnam (Vietnamnet, 2012). 
This kind of movement, according to Schneider and Schmitter (2004), Dia-
mond (1999), Linz and Stepan (1996) and O’Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead 
(1986), expose the fact that Vietnam is in the progress of democratization.  
Przeworski (1986) and Bova (1991) explain that in democratizing countries, 
some authoritarian leaders, known as liberalizers within the authoritarian regime, 
look for and form alliances because of emerging social unrest. In the case of Vi-
etnam, social unrest stems from the economic slowdown, widespread corruption, 
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power abuse in cities and provinces, unaccountability and tensions over the South 
China Sea. The PM sought alliances while taking advantage of these disruptions. 
It is noteworthy to mention that before being criticized by the party, Dung rarely 
raised his voice on disruptions in the country. To establish his alliance and trust 
from the people, the PM increasingly voiced his concerns over growing problems 
and showed his commitment to solving these issues through the media. For in-
stance, he ordered the punishment of local civil servants who allegedly abused 
their power to appropriate people’s land, and recently he insisted that the Ministry 
of Health takes some responsibility for the mismanagement of measles outbreaks 
and so on. Dung has successfully demonstrated his efforts in protecting Vietnam’s 
national interests. Addressing the 12th Shangri La dialogue and the 24th ASEAN 
Summit in Nay Pyi Taw, his speech focused on the tensions over the South China 
Sea, an issue attracting concerns of the international community and the Vietnam-
ese people (“PM Highlights Strategic”, 2013; “ASEAN Summit’s East”, 2014). 
Recently, for the first time, he sent mobile phone messages to every Vietnamese 
citizen regarding the defense of national sovereignty (Brummitt, 2014).  
This leads to the conclusion that Vietnam has been in democratic transition 
since 2010, although it is still being ruled by the CPV. The country is showing 
signals of liberalization, part of the democratization process. There is an internal 
rupture between political leaders, mitigation of oppression of political dissidents 
and an amplification of civil liberties. The transition is also leading to major so-
cial and political changes, including an increase in press freedom in the country. 
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Chapter 4: Democratization leading to higher levels of per-
ceptions of corruption 
Hypothesis 2: Democratization heightens levels of perceived corruption.  
This chapter examines the relationship between democratization and corrup-
tion, and the history of corruption in Vietnam. The CPI is analyzed regarding its 
applicability to Vietnam, and other democratizing countries. 
4.1. Previous literature on the relationship between democratization and 
corruption 
Over the past twenty years, corruption has been seen as part of the processes 
of decentralization and democratization in the world. For that reason, emerging 
democratic regimes such as Russia, Turkey and Latin America have endured a 
steady rise in corruption levels after initiating democratization (Mohtad & Roe, 
2003). 
As the media have revealed, corruption has become rampant in democratiz-
ing countries. Nearly 100 cases of major corruption in Brazil have been published 
by the New York Times since its democratization beginning in 1985. At the same 
time, Mexico which started undertaking political liberalization in 2001, saw 1,000 
corruption cases (Tavares, 2007). Tavares perceives corruption as a rising prob-
lem in transition countries. 
An increase in the number of corruption scandals in democratizing coun-
tries, according to many specialists, is driven by the relationship between corrup-
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tion and democratization. Sung (2004) claims that government corruption is ex-
pected to increase during the liberalization period. In particular, countries that re-
cently escaped from authoritarian or totalitarian regimes are said to be especially 
affected by growing corruption and “money politics” (Moran, 2001). According 
to Rose-Ackerman (1999), the growth of corruption is led by the liberalization 
process, and brings about massive changes in state restructuring, as well as my-
opic decision-making.  
Waggonner (2011) adds that in a democratizing regime, political leaders 
tend to take advantage of campaigns against corruption to shield their interests 
and power. This means that the democratic transformation is limited to a partial 
fulfillment that leads to an imperfect form of democracy. Not all people have an 
equal chance to enjoy freedom and rights that are created for them by newly de-
mocratizing regimes. Waggonner adds that the democratic process is only com-
plete if political elites are willing to carry out the process. In this case, checks and 
balances, civil society and independent justice institutions are not only inadequate 
to restrain corrupt elites but also become less effective in curbing societal corrup-
tion during democratization. O’Donnell (2007) adds that in countries, especially 
in Latin American, where democratic constitutions were introduced, unfair deci-
sions and lack of legal institutions that led to corrupt behaviors had been un-
changed in the early stages of democratic reform. 
Mohtadi and Roe (2003) also claim that corruption is seen in democratizing 
systems where checks and balances, transparency and institutional systems are 
weak. These weaknesses provide rent seekers with free entry into holding political 
power and public money. As a result, there is an increase in the number of those 
rent-seekers. For instance, Thailand’s situation during 1977-1991 can be taken as 
a typical example of democratizing systems seeing an increase in corruption. Its 
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national democratization began in 1977 after “The Thai Young Turks”, a group of 
middle ranking officials, exerted pressure on the government for liberalization 
(May & Selochan, 2004). Democratization and rapid economic growth finally led 
to the beginning of democracy in Thailand by the 1980s. This progress pushed the 
Thai system towards either a developmental state in Southeast Asia or a broker 
polity. However, the transformation did not last long because there was an in-
crease in the number of provincial politicians who took control of the legislature 
and the PM’s Office (Girling, 1997; King, 1996). They engaged in corrupt activi-
ties and established funds for their elections (King, 1996, p.136-137). Addition-
ally, they abused economic policy in order to gain personal benefits. Democratiza-
tion paused in 1991, as a result.  
Contributing to the literature on corruption and democratization, Linz and 
Stepan (1996) assert that newly-democratized nations still encounter high levels 
of corruption, even when the transition to democracy finishes or 
...sufficient agreement has been reached about political procedures to produce 
an elected government, when a government comes to power that is the result 
of a free and popular vote, when this government has de facto authority to gen-
erate new policies, and when the executive, legislative and judicial power gen-
erated by the new democracy does not have to share power with other bodies 
de jure (p.3).  
 
Johnston (1999) explains that feeble or unstable economies as well as a 
flourishing of illegal businesses and trade can be easily observed in new democra-
cies. He adds that these weaknesses, as a result, motivate the birth of illegal rings 
and ineffective institutions. Corruption can be deeply ingrained in newly democ-
ratized countries. Corrupt practices become widespread due to the lack of strong 
institutions. Dahl (1971) describes newly-democratized societies with ineffective 
institutional frameworks as pointless and chaotic systems. Weak institutions, 
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which come to form networks of bureaucracy, engender impediments in demo-
cratic consolidation and market development. Consequently, corruption begins a 
continuous cycle.  
Mohtadi and Roe (2003) state that the corruption cycle in young democratic 
regimes will be broken if the number of rent-seekers increases rapidly. If there is a 
boom in the number of rent-seekers, and competition between them, the rents they 
might earn decrease, and, at the same time, the economic and political outlook be-
comes brighter. Mohtadi and Roe add that a decrease in rents may also be brought 
about by a consolidation of democratic reforms, which can severely punish rent-
seeking behavior.  
Moreno (2003) describes another reason for the growth of corruption in 
newly democratic countries. Accordingly, corruption is the legacy of previous au-
thoritarianism that is continued in new democratic regimes, although new govern-
ments make a serious attempt to combat it. In Mexico’s 2001 referendum, for in-
stance, about 40 per cent of respondents believed that governmental officials in 
newly democratizing Mexico were involved in receiving payoffs (Moreno, 2003). 
Moreno also claims that the high level of perceived corruption is the result of the 
people’s rising awareness of corruption in society. Six out of ten respondents as-
serted that people were likely to be involved in corrupt behaviors after becoming 
public officials. Respondents may be wrong about the levels of corruption but 
they are always accurate about the levels of perceived corruption (Tanzi & 
Davoodi, 1997). They expect, in newly democratic regimes, lower levels of cor-
ruption. Moreno assumes, moreover, that increasingly perceived levels of corrup-
tion do not correlate with democratization. To support his argument, he analyzes 
data collected from a survey of 60 societies. He concludes that there are high per-
ceptions of corruption in countries where corrupt practices are culturally rejected. 
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He gave examples of Nigeria and Vietnam, two of the most corrupt countries in 
the CPI, but that have very low scores in the index of corruption permissiveness 
(Moreno, 2003). 
Analyzing surveys and reports of the Business International dataset of 66 
countries within the period, 1980 to 1983, and data of TI of 51 countries between 
1988 and 1992, Montinola and Jackmand (2002) conclude that corruption in less 
democratic regimes is lower than in democratic ones if political power in the dem-
ocratic regimes remains unchanged.  
Sharing a different view on perceptions of corruption, Treisman (2000) con-
tends that perception levels of corruption in democratic countries depend on 
length of existence. What he means is that perceptions of corruption will be re-
duced if the democratic regime has existed over a period of time. 
Keefer (2005) observes that there is extreme heterogeneity in the perfor-
mance of new democracies. This is because young democracies are less able to 
make credible promises to voters before elections, and hence are more likely to 
rely on patrons to establish a credible reputation with voters. This causes new de-
mocracies to be more susceptible to gearing public policies toward transfers and 
rent seeking than provision of broader public goods. As a result, countries that are 
democratizing are more likely to face increased corruption levels than are estab-
lished democracies. Over time, though, these countries should see a decrease in 
corruption as well. 
Finally, democratization entails the writing of new laws and a new constitu-
tion. This, along with whether or not these laws are enforced, may end up creating 
more opportunities for corruption. For example, in Brazil, the perception of cor-
ruption has increased since democratization in 1985 as new electoral rules have 
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decreased the ability of the executive to build coalitions and assure loyalty in 
Congress (Geddes & Neto, 1992). 
Former president, Fernando Collor de Mello, nearly managed to buy enough 
votes to escape impeachment for his own corrupt practices. Collor's administra-
tion was involved in a scheme that facilitated public contracts and influenced gov-
ernment decisions in exchange for kickbacks and commissions, with some of this 
money being used to pay for maintenance of Collor's house and expenses of his 
family (Geddes & Neto, 1992). This, in the end, resulted in his impeachment, re-
moval from the Presidency, and his banning from public office for ten years. 
4.2. Corruption and perception of corruption in Vietnam 
4.2.1. A history of corruption in Vietnam 
Ten years after the establishment of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam in 
1976, the concept of corruption was new to the Vietnamese people. Only after the 
“renovation process” (Doi Moi) in 1986, was corruption first listed as a social 
problem in the Vietnamese government’s official documents, and labelled a “na-
tional threat” requiring the mobilizing of forces in a Prime Ministerial decision in 
1991 (Razafindrakoto, Roubaud, & Salomon, 2011). 
Despite the Vietnamese government’s efforts, corruption has remained a 
major threat to Vietnam’s development. According to the latest World Bank En-
terprise survey, over 50 per cent of businessmen have been involved in exchang-
ing gifts for favours (World Bank Group, 2009), while nearly 60 per cent of enter-
prises said that bribe money is necessary for ‘lubricating’ corrupt bureaucrats 
(Kien, 2011). the Ministry of Investment and Planning reports that the annual 
damage caused by corruption is equivalent to 30 per cent of infrastructure invest-
ment (Tuong, 2005). Moreover, citizens have become familiar with corruption, as 
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shown by 90 per cent of interviewees asserting that they have to give extra money 
to public servants for accomplishing administrative procedures. According to 
2010’s CPI Index, Vietnam ranked below average with a score of 2.7 on a 0 
(highly corrupt) to 10 (highly clean) scale (Transparency International, 2010). Ac-
cordingly, it ranked 116 out of 178 countries worldwide. All eleven key public 
agencies in Vietnam have high volumes of corruption cases. Recently, many cor-
ruption scandals have been revealed by the mass media. For example, giant State 
groups such as Vinashin, a leading shipbuilding firm, and Vinalines, a top ship-
ping firm, have contracted debts of nearly US$5 billion each, and their chairmen 
are under investigation for committing a number of offences (Bach, 2013). The 
Japanese government has recently accused a high-ranking Vietnamese official of 
taking US$1 million in bribes from a Japanese construction firm (Vnexpress, 
n.d.a). 
4.2.2. Perception of corruption in Vietnam 
Table 4.1: Vietnam’s Perception of Corruption 
 
Country Year Score 
 
 
 
VIETNAM 
2014 31 
2013 31 
2012 31 
2011 2.9/29 
2010 2.7/27 
2009 2.7/27 
  Source: Transparency International. Retrieved December 12, 2014 from http://www.transparency.org/re 
search/cpi 
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Although Vietnam has always stood at the bottom in the perceived corrup-
tion-ranking table since it was first listed in 1997, the country has achieved some 
success in reducing its perceived corruption levels. In 2012, a new system of cal-
culating corruption was used together with new countries added to the index, 
which started to use a 0 (highly corrupt) -100 (highly clean) scale instead of the 0 
(highly corrupt) to 10 (highly clean) scale (Transparency International, 2012). The 
usage of the new system helps concerned individuals and groups to see any minor 
difference between years. This thesis will use a 0-100 scale to display any change 
in scores given to Vietnam. Accordingly, scores from 2009 to 2011 will be con-
verted to a two-digit number (see table 4.1). 
Before 2011, Vietnam received a low score for perceived corruption that hit 
27 in 2009 and 2010. The low score was given by the TI Index during a time 
when Vietnam started its democratization process. There was an increase in its 
score to 29 in 2011 from 27 in 2010 (see table 4.1). The scores went up to 31 in 
2012 and remained there until 2014. 
4.2.3. Democratization lowers levels of perceived corruption in Vietnam 
Vietnam started its democratization process in 2010. As shown in table 4.1, 
democratization has lowered the perception of corruption in the country although 
the real levels of corruption, which cannot be estimated, might not have de-
creased. It should be concluded that democratization in Vietnam reduces only the 
levels of perceived corruption. This conclusion is defying the assumptions of 
many specialists, who concluded that the levels of corruption are high in democra-
tizing countries (Liz & Stepan, 1996; Johnston, 1999; Mohtadi & Roe, 2003; 
Dahl, 1971). The relationship between democratization and levels of perceived 
corruption in Vietnam is significantly different from that of other countries in the 
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same situation. Other democratizing countries, such as Thailand during 1977-
1991, have perhaps mirrored Vietnam’s pattern. Thai national democratization be-
gun in 1977 after “The Thai Young Turks”, a group of middle ranking officials, 
exerted pressure on the government for liberalization in 1976 (May & Selochan, 
2004). Democratization and rapid economic growth finally led to the establish-
ment of democracy in Thailand by the 1980s. This progress pushed the Thai sys-
tem towards either a developmental state of Southeast Asia or a broker polity. 
However, the transformation did not last long because there was an increase in the 
number of provincial politicians, and these groups took control of the legislature 
and PM’s office (Girling, 1997; King, 1996). These political leaders became in-
volved in corrupt activities and took advantage of economic policies to obtain per-
sonal benefits (King, 1996, p.136-137). 
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Chapter 5: More democratization, more press freedom 
Hypothesis 3: Democratization in Vietnam increases press freedom.  
This chapter looks into the relations between democratization and press 
freedom and the levels of press freedom in a state, based on the indices compiled 
by FH and Reporters Without Border, which judges the levels of press freedom in 
more than 100 countries, including Vietnam. The lack of accuracy and objective-
ness of these indices will also be assessed. Additionally, the real developments re-
garding press freedom in Vietnam will be shown via statistics and examples.  
5.1. Relationship between press freedom and democratization 
In an interview with the Guardian about the role of free media in strengthen-
ing democracy, the World Bank’s former president, James Wolfensohn, does not 
hesitate to state that  
A free press is not a luxury. A free press is at the absolute core of equitable de-
velopment, because if you cannot enfranchise poor people, if they do not have 
a right to expression, if there is no searchlight on corruption and inequitable 
practices, you cannot build the public consensus needed to bring about change 
(Wolfensohn, 1999, para.2). 
The statement of the former World Bank head illustrates the fact that a free 
media is crucial in establishing a democratic state that guarantees an effective 
checks and balances system. In contrast, media without freedom becomes a state-
owned body that performs much like a propaganda machine (Fox, 1998). O’Neil 
(1997) contends that media in communist states plays a key role in spreading 
communist ideology while blocking right wing messages. Mughan and Gunther 
(2000) define state-owned media as instruments to suppress journalistic freedom 
and prohibit people from accessing alternative information and views.  
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Between the late 1950s and the early 1960s, most theorists had the same 
stand as James’s in his notion of the crucial role of free media in promoting de-
mocracy. Lerner (1958) notes that a free media serves as one of the most decisive 
factors in the development of a state. Accordingly, the development of media net-
works such as radio and television has helped people get updates on political de-
velopments and access more true information about politicians and others. He 
notes that mass media such as newspapers, magazines and TV play a big role in 
educating people as well as changing their lifestyles.  
However, after problems in the democratic transition of Latin America, Asia 
and Sub- Saharan Africa, notions of the role of free media in democratization 
changed. Theorists began to argue that mass communications cannot create or 
boost the democratic transition, nor can they nurture democratic states. Rather, 
they can only maintain a dictatorship, promote cronyism and dominance over the 
media market, and act as a means of transmitting information to deprived people 
(Huntington, 1993; Mowlana, 1985; Stevenson & Shaw, 1984). Skeptics con-
tended that media freedom and other sorts of freedoms are outcomes of democrati-
zation, instead of causes of democratization. Amongst them, some saw media 
freedom as a mere democratic barometer. Moreover, media freedom was said to 
hamper the process of democratization because it could be used to support former 
authoritarian regimes. 
Hackett and Zhao (2005) explain the depreciation of the media’s role in 
democratic transitions by showing the lack of comprehensive and synchronous 
studies of politics and media. According to them, most of the studies focus on 
identifying the role of the democratization process in promoting media or the de-
mocratizing media. Moreover, Voltmer and Rownsley (2009) emphasize that the 
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shortage of reliable sources and hands-on assessments leads to a failure in ad-
dressing the causal connection between democratization and media and the under-
estimation of the media’s role in the democratization process. Rather, the media is 
even used as a measure of democratic development or a prerequisite for demo-
cratic stability (Berman & Witzner, 1997; Dahl, 1989; McConnell & Becker, 
2002).  
Norris (2000) affirms that the media has a great impact on the development 
of democratization. He contends that the media serves three important roles: as a 
power-misuse monitor that enhances accountability and transparency; as a civil 
society forum; and as an orientation for policy-setters (Norris, 2000). Street 
(2010) sees media as a state body that promotes democratic elections, political 
competition, laws, state bodies, and social organizations. McConnell and Becker 
(2002) contend that the media changes its roles continuously if democratic transi-
tion is moving forward. In some cases, the media has no role, particularly if dem-
ocratic transition is stable and thus no longer affected by media and other sorts of 
communications. 
Gurevitch and Blumler (1990), Schudson (1995), Randall (1998), Scammel 
and Semetko (2000), and Norris (2006) all agree that media is accountable for 
overseeing what is happening in a democratizing setting, and shares responsibility 
for ensuring the functioning of a democratic state and society (Gurevitch & Blum-
ler, 1990; Schudson, 1995; Randall, 1998; Scammel & Semetko, 2000; Norris, 
2006). The media, in some contexts, is given the task of checking and balancing 
the power of the ruling party or governmental. According to Waisbord (2000), the 
media acts as the “fourth estate”, accountable for observing the wrongdoings of 
bureaucrats or heads of government agencies in a liberal state. Furthermore, the 
media drives the public to keep an eye on the performance of authorities. By 
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providing the public with accurate details about governmental conduct, and en-
lightening people regarding the deficiencies of the ruling government, the media 
not only helps electors make right choices on their own but also contributes to fair 
elections and denunciations of corruption and other misbehavior (Schedler, 1998; 
Whitehead, 2002). 
In a democratizing context, the media is assigned two main tasks. First, the 
media is obliged to report on the changes of the current regime. Citizens, accord-
ingly, have the chance to digest this information and consider whether the govern-
ment is legitimate, doing a good job, and not abusing its power. In this sense, the 
deteriorating regime suffers a loss of influence while a new order is emerging. 
Second, the media is tasked with legitimizing the emerging regime. The infor-
mation that is relevant to a regime that is on its way out will be provided in order 
to make the public perceive the changes that are occurring. In the wake of the col-
lapse of the old regime, the democratization process will begin (Bennett, 1998). 
According to Mughan and Gunther (2000), the media is one of the major 
factors in bringing about democratization. In the liberalizing stage, the media has 
more space to give people a voice, and functions as an effective channel for politi-
cal ideas. This means that the media is likely to subvert the legal basis of authori-
tarians if it is allowed free reign. In Mughan and Gunther’s research, under the 
Franco regime in Spain between 1939 and 1975, only magazines were seen as 
needing tight control; newspapers and radio broadcast were largely uncontrolled, 
as the Franco government applied strict rules to regulate how the media worked. 
After the Franco period, there were no longer strict laws on the media, and various 
sources of information including sources of non-formal perspectives were allowed 
to appear in the press, and the public was given a better grasp of the nature of the 
transition as an ordinary event. Also, the media helped people become aware that 
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authoritarian regimes were waning, and this in turn normalized and deepened plu-
ralism among the people. 
As Randall (1993) asserts, the media threatens the legitimacy of non-demo-
cratic regimes and provokes democratic transition. During the transition period, 
the media spurs political discourse, provides its own analysis of on-going national 
affairs as well as nourishing competitive politics. Randall (1998) notes that only 
in the initial phases of transition do democratic principles gain favor with the me-
dia. During these periods, state policies and political attitudes all are influenced by 
the media (Salgado, 2009). The media tends to be politicized and produces many 
politically oriented reports after the early transition phases end, however. Randall 
(1998) contends that the media during the consolidation period not only maintains 
democratic principles but also fights against corruption and ineffective state bod-
ies, among other issues. In this period, the media can even face challenges from 
critics and erosion of the confidence of the public.  
By highlighting the differences between domestic and international media, 
Huntington (1991) provides a new perception of the media’s role in the transition 
process. In his view, the development of international media was only radical un-
til the third wave of democracy. During that period, the international media con-
tributed to the education of people about the non-existence of political autonomy 
and the lack of pluralism. Voltmer and Rownsley (2009) argue that the interna-
tional media still has a positive influence on political leaders and audiences, while 
Livingston (1997) claims that the adoption of new foreign policies is greatly af-
fected by the involvement of the international media. 
Agreeing with the idea that a free media boosts democracy, Jebril, Stetka 
and Loveless (2013) also note that the free media and the transition process sup-
port each other. As long as the media has been liberalized, the democratization 
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process and human development tend to advance because reporters can use new 
press freedom to produce impartial and truthful articles that assist in building 
transparent and accountable governance (Norris, 2009). A reciprocal relationship, 
according to resource mobilization theory, benefits the public if access to the me-
dia is unrestricted, and there is also a rapid increase in the number of media out-
lets (Loveless, 2010).  
As has become apparent, the role of the media in democratic transitions has 
been discussed by many political scientists and scholars of communications. Ber-
man and Witzner (1997) suggest that democracy cannot be perceived without ac-
cessing and sharing facts, events and stories. Communication channels are also 
highly evaluated, as they are both the crucial means of promoting democratic 
practices and part of very essence of democracy. Berman and Witzner add that the 
media in a strongly democratized state act as uncensored organs, transmitting 
truthful and reliable information to the public. By supplying citizens with infor-
mation and disclosing societal misconduct, the media raises people’s awareness 
about problems and gives them a better understanding of their society. Addition-
ally, the media creates the chance for people to oppose controversial decisions 
made by political elites and raise their concerns over various issues in society. The 
media is essentially a communal forum which allows for public evaluation of dis-
putatious issues, various viewpoints and valuable advice. The democratized media 
can monitor authorities, enterprises and the community (Curran, 1991). As 
Mughan and Gunther (2000) and Garnham (1992) assert, mass media has a signif-
icant role in establishing and maintaining democratic regulations. O’Neil (1998) 
even highly assesses the importance of the media regarding theories of democ-
racy. McQuail (1994) argues that the media has a big impact on both democratic 
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and non-democratic governments. With the aim of finding whether the media sup-
ports the transition to democracy, Gunther, Montero and Wert (2000) note that 
during the consolidation period, the media helps the acceptance of the emerging 
state and promotes democratic norms (As cited in McConnell & Becker, 2002). 
However, in the case of Nigeria, Ette (2000) argues that the media might deregu-
late democratic regimes. Wolfensohn (1999) sees a reciprocal relationship be-
tween the democratic transition and the media. He asserts that in the first phase of 
the transition, the liberalization process, the authoritarian regime relinquishes con-
trol of the media to private enterprise. It means that media products such as radio 
and TV broadcasts and content on newer technologies such as the Internet and cell 
phones are accessible to the people. Therefore, a wide range of culture, ideas and 
news can be exchanged among members of the public.  
5.2. Press freedom indicators 
To judge the levels of press freedom in a state, the indices compiled by FH 
and RSF, amongst others, are frequently used by researchers and specialists on 
communication studies.  
5.2.1. Freedom House and press freedom in Vietnam 
FH’s Press Freedom Index should be distinguished from FH’s reports on 
democratic levels. As mentioned in the first chapter of the thesis, FH’s Freedom 
in the World focuses on scores for political rights and civil liberties, and serves as 
a basis for grading democratic levels in states. However, FH’s Press Freedom In-
dex, which was established in 1980, has a different role. The index serves as a 
watchdog on risks for media freedom. It sees media censorship as a risk to demo-
cratic governments. In FH’s estimate, more than 85 per cent of global citizens 
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have no press freedom (Freedom House, n.d.). The press freedom in a state is as-
sessed based on its annual Freedom of the Press report. In the report, there are 197 
nations and territories evaluated (Freedom House, n.d.). Every aspect of the press 
such as print, broadcast and the Internet, is evaluated in the index. To establish a 
score for a country, a set of over 20 questions is sent to regional staff, visitors, 
scholars and specialists. The team, including people working at FH and external 
advisors, is accountable for assessing and grading the countries after they receive 
sufficient data and information as well as the answers to the questionnaire survey.  
A 0-100 scale is used to rate countries as “Free”, “Partly Free”, or “not free” 
(Freedom House, n.d.). 
The media in a country is regarded as free if the score falls between 0-30, 
partly free if it is between 31-60, and not free if between 61-100 (Holtz-Bacha, 
n.d.).  
Table 5.1: Scores for Press Freedom in Vietnam 
 
Country VIETNAM 
Year 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Score 82 83 84 84 84 
  Source: Freedom House. Retrieved December 20, 2014 from https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-
press/2014/vietnam#.VOO7NkIdJFJ 
 
FH has been grading Vietnam since 2002. In the eyes of the organization, 
Vietnamese journalists have never had media freedom (Freedom House, 2002); 
Vietnam always ranks at the bottom of the FH’s annual index. In 2002, Vietnam 
scored 82nd in press freedom (See table 5.1). The score remained unchanged until 
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2010; it dropped to 83rd in 2011. This means that Vietnam’s press freedom has be-
come worse. Between 2012 and 2014, according to FH, the state has less press 
freedom than it had in the previous years. 
The FH Index is based on risks of censorship of the media, the harassment 
and imprisonment of journalists and the ownership of media outlets. Censorship, 
according to FH, can be seen through the adoption of laws against press freedom 
(Freedom House, 2010b, 2011b, 2012b, 2013b, 2014b). The country’s 1999 Press 
Law forces reporters to pay their victims compensation for both tangible and non-
tangible losses, even if they report the truth. Article 88 penalizes anti-government 
conduct by the media. Recently, the Vietnamese government has been denounced 
by the organization for adopting the decree on Management, Provision and Use of 
Internet Services and Online Information. According to the organization, the gov-
ernment uses the decree as a tool to control online information sources, especially 
those against the state and the CPV. The organization has accused the Vietnamese 
Government of censoring Internet content and inhibiting websites that are listed as 
opposing the Government. It has said that this activity is detrimental to the state’s 
political legitimacy. According to FH, by attaching malware to Vietnamese soft-
ware, the government has been blocking many websites that discuss politically 
sensitive topics. The media, it is said, is forced to become a tool to propagate the 
government’s ideologies or plans. The organization asserts that only at the provin-
cial levels does the media enjoy the freedom to investigate and report wrongdo-
ings and to heighten people’s awareness of constitutional amendments and the ex-
istence of laws. Regarding the harassment and imprisonment of journalists men-
tioned by the organization, journalists who write about such sensitive topics as 
corruption, anti-China stories and reports supporting political dissent, are severely 
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punished. Some have been dismissed or fined, while others have been imprisoned. 
According to the organization, they violate an implied rule. 
According to the organization, in 2010, reporter Huy Duc was dismissed 
from his position after publishing stories about the abuse of human rights in Vi-
etnam (Freedom House, 2010b). Three years later, Nguyen Van Khuong, a re-
porter from Tuoi Tre Newspaper, was sentenced to four years in prison as he re-
ported on a policeman who took bribes (Freedom House, 2013b). In addition, FH 
reports that 18 journalists have been put in jail so far (Freedom House, 2014b). 
The number is considered to be one of the highest in the world, and suggests that 
Vietnam is one of the worst countries for press freedom. Among the 18 impris-
oned journalists, Le Quoc Quan, a Vietnamese blogger, who was famous for his 
writings denouncing the CPV’s red-tape, got a 3.5 year jail term for avoiding cor-
porate income tax (Freedom House, 2014b). The others were arrested because 
they all raised politically dissenting voices or overly criticized the state apparatus. 
For instance, Paulus Le Son, and 13 others who were said to violate Article 79, 
were sentenced to 13 years in prison. Or Nguyen Van Hai, who called on demon-
strations against the Chinese government, was jailed in 2012. Discussing owner-
ship of the media, FH avers that nearly all of 850 newspapers, magazines, radio 
and television channels are under state ownership. They are all accountable for 
propagating the CPV’s ideology. Despite allowing foreign channels to be broad-
cast in its territory, the Vietnamese government requires them to be translated into 
Vietnamese before airing.  
FH does acknowledge that there has been an increase in press freedom in 
Vietnam (Freedom House, 2013b, 2014b). VietnamNet, an online newspaper, is 
regarded as a media outlet that has the freedom to report on sensitive issues, at 
least to some extent. This newspaper has for the past few years played a leading 
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role in reporting on issues such as corruption, leadership roles and some aspects 
of democracy. Moreover, FH appreciates the development of hidden online news-
papers such as To Quoc and Tu Do Ngon Luan. The Internet has also been re-
garded as a useful tool in raising the people’s voice. According to the organiza-
tion’s statistics, nearly 45 per cent of the population have access to the Internet 
(Freedom House, 2014b). The high percentage of Internet access has brought 
about dialogue among citizens through social networking sites and forums. It con-
tends that the CPV has created challenges for itself, as the party wants to improve 
current technology and communications while still wishing to keep restraining 
strictures on the Internet at the same time. 
5.2.2. Reporters Without Borders’ World Press Freedom Index on Vietnam       
Beside FH’s reports on press freedom, the indices of RSF have been re-
garded as useful sources for researchers and specialists who are concerned with 
media freedom and development. The indices reflect the state of freedom of jour-
nalists, media outlets and netizens in countries and territories. They are published 
annually by RSF. By using questionnaires, the indices can assess the type of vio-
lence used to target journalists, including killing, incarceration, assault and intimi-
dation (Reporters Without Borders, 2010, 2011-2012, 2013, 2014a). Levels of im-
punity enjoyed by people who have violated press freedom are also measured. In 
addition, the indices report the state of censorship and the role of the press in re-
porting. Economic factors that might influence the quality of reports are also 
gauged. The legal environment, information exchange and autonomy of the press 
are also noted in the indices (Burgess, 2010).   
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The number of countries listed in the indices has increased year by year. 
While, in 2010, only 178 countries were listed in the indices; that number in-
creased to 180 in 2014. Similarly, the group has attempted to expand the number 
of criteria to evaluate press freedom more accurately. In 2010, RSF compiled a 
survey containing 43 factors for the evaluation of media freedom in each country 
on the list. In 2011 and 2012, the number of factors increased to 44. In 2013 and 
2014, a new questionnaire was drawn up that counted the number of journalists, 
media subordinates and Internet users who were incarcerated, kidnapped, harassed 
and murdered while doing their jobs. The number of media outlets that are being 
censored were also counted. More questions have been created, such as those re-
garding unfair distribution of grants and advertisement spending. The 2013 and 
2014 indices are based on six criteria, instead of 44 criteria, for their overall as-
sessment of press freedom. They are Pluralism, Media independence, Environ-
ment and Self-Censorship, Legislative Framework, Transparency and Infrastruc-
ture. The 0-100 ranking scale has been applied. However, RSF does not group 
countries as “free”, “partly free” or “not free”. According to Holtz-Bacha (n.d.), 
such a classification might be the outcome of unfair decisions, which has per-
suaded the organization to avoid that grouping method. 
 
Table 5.2: Vietnam’s Ranking and Scores for Press Freedom  
 
Country Vietnam 
Year 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Score 75.75 114 114 71.78 72.36 
Ranking 165 172 172 172 174 
   Source: Reporters Without Borders. Retrieved December 15, 2014 from http://rsf.org/index2014/en-in-
dex2014.php 
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In its report, delivered in 2010, Vietnam was accused of violating freedom 
of speech. Thus, it was ranked 165th among 178 countries (See table 5.2). In 2011, 
the country’s press freedom was regarded as the worst; its ranking dropped to 
172nd. This standing remained until 2013, when it fell to 174th in 2014. 
5.3. The actual situation of press freedom in Vietnam 
Both FH and RSF claim that press freedom in Vietnam has been getting 
worse since 2010. FH cited reasons such as the state issuing decrees and laws 
against press freedom and jailing up to 18 journalists since 2008; additionally, the 
state does not allow the operation of private media. Meanwhile, RSF assesses the 
three factors of legal environment, political environment and economic environ-
ment. Every year, a questionnaire, including questions about the three elements, is 
sent to regional specialists and specialists, journalists and jurists around the world. 
This thesis will argue that these indices published by FH and RSF are based on bi-
ased, inaccurate and untruthful methodologies that greatly affect the ranking of 
Vietnam’s press freedom. They fail to reflect the actual status of press freedom in 
Vietnam. 
5.3.1 The biased and inaccurate methodology of Freedom House 
Chapter 2 of the thesis discusses the general bias of FH limited and inappro-
priate methodology, unreliable information sources and prejudice against non-US 
allies. Specifically, FH’s democracy indices throughout the period 2010 to 2014 
are questionable. Likewise, the FH’s press freedom index shows a similar bias 
against Vietnam. 
In its annual reports, FH accuses Vietnam’s Press Law of penalizing jour-
nalists who cause damage to individuals or groups. In our estimate, however, 
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FH’s staff focused primarily the title on the name of the law, ignoring its content. 
For example, according to Article 28 of the law on the press, journalists are re-
quired to compensate their victims if they violate their legal interests (Law on 
press, 1999, V.N). It can be argued in this regard that Viet Nam is not limiting the 
freedom of journalists, but protecting the legal rights of individuals. Moreover, 
FH criticizes Article 88 of the Penal Code, and a decree in 2006 banning anti-state 
propaganda and information exchange. However, this is completely in line with 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966), laws are neces-
sary to ensure national security as well as public order. 
Even democratic countries such as Germany or the US have laws against 
anti-government propaganda. The 18 U.S.C. § 2258 (Legal Information Institute, 
n.d.) states that: 
Whoever knowingly or willfully advocates, abets, advises, or teaches the duty, 
necessity, desirability, or propriety of overthrowing or destroying the govern-
ment of the United States or the government of any State, Territory, District or 
Possession thereof, or the government of any political subdivision therein, by 
force or violence, or by the assassination of any officer of any such govern-
ment; or  
Whoever, with intent to cause the overthrow or destruction of any such gov-
ernment, prints, publishes, edits, issues, circulates, sells, distributes, or pub-
licly displays any written or printed matter advocating, advising, or teaching 
the duty, necessity, desirability, or propriety of overthrowing or destroying 
any government in the United States by force or violence, or attempts to do so; 
or  
Whoever organizes or helps or attempts to organize any society, group, or as-
sembly of persons who teach, advocate, or encourage the overthrow or de-
struction of any such government by force or violence; or becomes or is a 
member of, or affiliates with, any such society, group, or assembly of persons, 
knowing the purposes thereof—  
Shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or 
both, and shall be ineligible for employment by the United States or any de-
partment or agency thereof, for the five years next following his conviction.  
If two or more persons conspire to commit any offense named in this section, 
each shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than twenty years, 
or both, and shall be ineligible for employment by the United States or any de-
partment or agency thereof, for the five years next following his conviction. 
(para.1-5).  
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The accusation that Vietnam is prohibiting the exchange of information is 
also rejected by Minister of Information and Communications, Nguyen Bac Son, 
who asserts that the decree does not inhibit the Vietnamese people from search-
ing, exchanging and sharing online information. It does not, in other words, block 
online criticism of the state and the CPV, but rather encourages the development 
of the Internet (Kemp, 2012). Moreover, even if the government had the intention 
of blocking information on the Internet, they would fail because it is beyond their 
capacity. It is beyond all governments’ capacity, for that matter. Information on 
the Internet is supplied from various sources, servers and countries. Information 
supplied from some domestic sources or websites can be blocked, but not that 
from abroad. One third of Vietnam’s population accesses the Internet. Many Viet-
namese use social networking websites such as Facebook, Yahoo or Twitter and 
online newspapers to express their thoughts, and this includes complaints about 
the state’s weaknesses and personal troubles with local authorities. For instance, 
the media revealed economic losses and corruption in Vinashin and Vinalines, the 
two giant state-owned groups (Bach, 2013). PM Nguyen Tan Dung, who directly 
managed state owed companies in 2012, had to admit his mistakes as a result 
(Minh, 2012). In 2014, many ordinary citizens, via their social networks, voiced 
their dismay with Vietnam’s government after observing that the Government had 
no active response to China’s violation of Vietnamese territory. The PM, as a con-
sequence, reassured the people that he would try his best to protect the country’s 
seas (“Toàn Văn Phát Biểu”, 2014). Although the state does not allow political 
dissent, and arrests many dissidents, it releases many of them before they finish 
their prison terms. Last year, Vietnamese Facebook users shared information 
about gatherings at the Chinese Embassy in Viet Nam to show their opposition to 
the illegal movement of China in the East Sea (“Opposition to China”, 2014). The 
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information was not blocked, and subsequent demonstrations drew thousands of 
people nationwide. No one, not even the organizers, was arrested. These events 
were reported by the Washington Post, AP, ABC News, BBC, DPA, and other in-
ternational news agencies (Tam, 2014).  
Regarding FH’s definition of what constitutes a journalist in Viet Nam, it is 
not hard to find its inaccuracy. Based on this, people who write blogs, post any in-
formation on Twitter and other social networks can be regarded as journalists. 
Those “journalists”, in the eyes of FH, serve as reliable watchdogs and must be 
protected by the law. However, FH often gives no sufficient evidence regarding 
the credentials or validity of these sources. Instead, any blogger or Internet user 
who shares anti-government views is listed as a trustworthy journalist, theoreti-
cally protected by a democratic press law. For example, blogger Truong Minh 
Duc, who spread anti-government propaganda in 2007, was arrested and sen-
tenced to 5 years in jail (Freedom House, 2009). Nevertheless, FH counted him a 
journalist who should have been protected by the press law. FH has always at-
tempted to regard political dissidents in Vietnam as journalists. In its 2014 report, 
18 journalists were said to have been arrested since 2008. However, it should be 
noted that 17 amongst the 18 so-called journalists were bloggers and opposition 
activists who opposed the existence of the CPV, while the other one who was sen-
tenced to prison was involved in corruption.   
The Oxford Dictionary defines a journalist as “a person who writes for 
newspapers or magazines or prepares news to be broadcast on radio and televi-
sion” (Journalist, n.d.). More generally, and recently, Peters and Tandoc (2013), 
after collecting and analyzing various sources that explain the concept of a jour-
nalist, identify common elements and offer a comprehensive definition of a jour-
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nalist: “A journalist is someone employed to regularly engage in gathering, pro-
cessing, and disseminating (activities) news and information (output) to serve the 
public interest (social role)” (Peters & Tandoc, 2013, para. 4). The specialist spe-
cifically explains:  
To be employed means the person’s primary source of livelihood comes from 
journalistic activities, including the gathering, processing, and disseminating 
of news and information. The person’s role is to serve the public welfare (e.g., 
reporting on issues central to society’s well-being in matters of health, safety 
and order). As an output, news and information reflect not only journalistic ac-
tivities (e.g., processing in the form of analysis) but also the ethical principles 
(e.g., fairness) that govern those activities. Finally, the person must engage in 
the journalistic activities on a regular basis (para. 4). 
 
Beaujon (2013) agrees with this broad definition. According to him, the au-
thors relied on three main factors related to the academy, the law and to industry 
to form their definition of journalism.  
Regarding the emergence of the concept of citizen journalists who post 
news on social networks or video when witnessing or discovering some events, 
Stearns (2013, p.1) affirms that “more people than ever are participating in jour-
nalism. People are breaking news on Twitter, covering their communities on Fa-
cebook, live streaming, distributing news via email and writing in-depth blogs on 
issues of civic and community significance”. According to this observer, they are 
engaged in journalism, not “being” journalists. However, he also asserts that the 
line between who is and who isn’t a journalist gets blurry. The bloggers in Vi-
etnam who were categorized as journalists by FH and RSF did not actually engage 
in journalism, however. Rather, they apparently made up false stories and lured 
people into their political plots. When they were reported for this activity, the 
government simply sought an end to this annoyance (“Người Dân Nói”, 2012).  
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5.3.2. The biased and inaccurate methodology of Reporters Without Borders 
While seen as one of the most trustworthy sources for judging press free-
dom, RSF is accused of having a bias in favor of the West. According to Rosen-
thal (2007), France and EU countries support the organization with up to 4 million 
euros each year. He asserts that RSF consequently gives European countries high 
rankings in press freedom.  Rosenthal (2007, para. 2) adds that  
Its (RSF) highly curious rankings map are far better upon the external -- and, 
in certain cases, internal -- political agenda of the European Union than upon 
any concrete indicators of press freedoms, or restrictions thereupon, in the 
countries RSF claims to be objectively evaluating. 
 
In 2008, FH ranked France 40 while ranking the US 21. However, the rank-
ing, given by RSF for France and the US are in contrast to those given by the US-
based FH. France ranked 21 and the US ranked 40. Holtz-Bacha (n.d.) explains 
that the high ranking of France in press freedom shows the bias towards the home 
country of the organization. 
RSF was also denounced as a US instrument in Europe by some European 
and American political analysts (Burgess, 2010). The organization manages an in-
tensive and enduring crusade against the Communist regime in Cuba, with acts 
such as the occupation of a Cuban tourism office in Paris in 2003. The campaign 
is said to be secretly controlled by the US Government. There was an increase in 
RSF’s budget during the campaign, reportedly funneled from financial assistance 
of the US Government.  In the WikiLeaks case, RSF demonstrated its support for 
the US Government (Julliard & Coz, 2010). It condemned Julian Assange, 
founder of WikiLeaks, for publishing tens of thousands of documents. It is im-
portant to note that RSF had earlier regarded WikiLeaks as a good source, and had 
it published news from it the murder of two Reuters personnel in Bagdad in 2007.  
However, after the organization exposed the truth behind the US government’s 
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furtive activities, RSF started to inveigh against Wikileaks for imperiling the lives 
of people who worked or are working for the US (Burgess, 2010). 
Vietnam has also been suffering from RSF’s prejudice and one-sidedness 
and has ranked very low in RSF’s annual reports. One of the reasons given by 
RSF is that Vietnam has arrested and abused many journalists. Vietnam’s govern-
ment has never arrested or harassed valid journalists, however. Bloggers who 
have attempted to overthrow the government, induced people to overthrow the 
government, threatened the stability of society and violated laws, on the other 
hand, have been arrested. Internet bloggers, under the definition of RSF, are jour-
nalists who are only regarded as Internet users. RSF argued that in 2010, Nguyen 
Tien Trung, a Vietnamese blogger, whom they said should have been protected by 
the press law, was said to have been sentenced to prison for requesting democratic 
freedoms (Julliard, 201l). In fact, Trung was arrested because he was accused of 
spreading anti-government propaganda that was plainly illegal and false (Hoa, 
2009). RSF also condemned Vietnam for imprisoning bloggers Pham Minh Ho-
ang and Phan Thanh Hai (Reporters Without Borders, n.d.). Hoang’s arrest was 
the outcome of his efforts to allegedly overthrow the government, and because of 
his work for an anti-state organization, while Hai was arrested as he was spread-
ing false information about the state (C.Mai, 2011; T.Bac & T.Son, 2012). Their 
deeds violated Article 88 of Vietnam’s criminal code and threatened Vietnam’s 
national security.  
RSF’s unfairness can be observed through its methodology. First, the group 
does not mention how they determined scores for each question in their question-
naire. According to Burgess (2010), three to five points are given to a “yes” an-
swer while no points are allocated for a “no” answer in a yes-no question. For ex-
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ample, three points are given to a “yes” answer in a question such as: “Do the au-
thorities closely watch journalists?” For this question, a “no” answer will get no 
points. However, five points will be given to a  “yes” answer if the question refers 
to respondents’ opinion about an issue. A “no” answer converts to a 0. In a ques-
tion on numbers, a country might earn more than 5 points if journalists or media 
assistants or press freedom activists are killed in the country. In particular, a coun-
try will apparently receive 10 points if five deaths are recorded. Second, it should 
be noticed that in countries like Vietnam, respondents of RSF’s annual question-
naire are not local people because according to RSF, it is afraid that Vietnamese 
respondents might work for the government. A bias can also be observed via the 
fact that RSF staff favor answers from people working in the media sector in non-
oppressive countries. However, some might argue that even in free countries, peo-
ple who are involved in the media sector and working for the government cannot 
be free from governmental bias (Gehlbach & Sonin, 2008). The group’s prejudice 
against repressive countries can be seen from its selection of foreign “specialists” 
asked to respond to the annual question sheet about those countries. Regarding 
Vietnam’s press freedom, RSF has never referred to any name of respondents for 
the annual questionnaires on its website or methodology document despite the fact 
that Burgess (2010) asserts that names of the contributors to RSF’s reports are not 
confidential. No one can guarantee that those selected foreign specialists are not 
biased against Vietnam. Regarding the question about the number of journalists or 
media assistants killed or jailed with respect to their work, biased answers from 
the non-local specialists could result two reasons. First, RSF specialists tend to re-
gard bloggers who are arrested for spreading anti-government propaganda as jour-
nalists. Such bloggers are typically not journalists, however, and do not work for 
any newspaper or magazine. Second, RSF specialists tend to ignore the reasons 
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for the arrest of journalists. In 2012, Hoang Khuong was detained after he was al-
legedly involved in a major corruption case (Minh, 2012). However, RSF regional 
staff quietly noted that Khuong was kept in custody and sentenced to 4 years in 
prison because he attempted to “bribe” a traffic warden to find out whether Viet-
namese traffic officers resorted to bribery (“Four-year Jail Sentence”, 2012). 
Third, the unfairness in its accounting process for countries is still evident. The fi-
nal score for press freedom of a country is achieved after a three-step process 
(RSF, 2013, 2014a). During the first stage, RSF applies a formula for finding a 
first score based on questionnaires answered by RSF’s regional and local special-
ists. These measure six factors relating to press freedom, including Pluralism 
(Plu), Media Independence (Ind), Environment and Self-Censorship (EnA), Legis-
lative framework (CaL), Transparency (Tra) and Infrastructure (Inf). 
The first score (a) = 1/3 x Plu + 1/6 x (Ind + EnA + CaL) + 1/12 x (Tra + 
Inf) 
In the second stage, a score for violence (Exa) is added to a second formula 
to achieve the second score. The violence score is based on the length of detention 
of journalists and media assistants. The longer they are kept in prison, the more 
scores for violence a country achieves.  
The second score (b) = 1/5 x Exa + 4/15x Plu + 2/15 x (Ind + EnA +CaL) + 
1/15 x (Tra + Inf). 
At the final stage, MAX (a,b) is the final score for the press freedom of a 
country.  
However, the final score perhaps MAX (a,b) appears to be unfair and incor-
rect in almost every situation. Specifically, the violence score is perhaps another 
bias or mistake made by RSF. Vietnam is a typical example for illustrating the 
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point. In order to explain this example, it should be presumed that all of the Viet-
namese imprisoned bloggers are “journalists” to see whether the violence score is 
right or wrong. Between 2010 and 2014, The Committee to Protect Journalists 
(CPJ) reported that Vietnam arrested 24 “journalists” for violation of the state law 
(Committee to Protect Journalists, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014). Most of the ar-
rested “journalists” were said to be involved in spreading anti-state propaganda.  
Pham Viet Dao was one of the “journalists” enjoying an early released from 
prison. According to the CPJ, he was arrested in 2013 and faced a sentence of 7 
years in jail (Committee to Protect Journalists, 2013). Dao served 15 months in 
prison for violation of Article 258 of the Penal Code (abusing democratic free-
doms). Another “journalist” on early release is Nguyen Van Hai, owner of the 
Free Journalists Club Blog. He was arrested in 2012 and sentenced to 12 years in 
prison for violation of Article 88 of the Penal Code (Committee to Protect Jour-
nalists, 2013). Hai should have served until 2023. However, he was set free in 
2014 (“Mỹ Hoan Nghênh”, 2014). Luu Van Bay was convicted and sentenced to 4 
years in prison in 2011 for anti-government propaganda, and set free in 2014. 
Dinh Dang Dinh was arrested in 2011 was sentenced to 6 years and freed after 3 
(Committee to Protect Journalists, 2012, 2013). Phan Thanh Hai, co-owner of the 
Free Journalists Club Blog, was tried in 2010 and sentenced to 4 years in jail. The 
sentence was reduced to 3 years on appeal in 2012 (Committee to Protect Journal-
ists, 2011). Hai was released from prison in 2013. Pham Minh Hoang, who 
worked for an illegal organization, Viet Tan, and allegedly attempted to over-
throw the government, was arrested in 2010 (“Vietnam Jails Dissident”, 2011). 
He was convicted of violating Article 79 of the Penal Code and was sentenced to 
three years. His sentence was then reduced to 17 months after appeal (Diend-
anCTM, 2012). 
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Table 5.3: Real Duration of Prison Sentences in Vietnam  
Name Prison Sentence  Real imprisoned duration 
Pham Viet Dao 7 years 1 years and 3 months 
Nguyen Van Hai 12 years 2 years 
Luu Van Bay 4 years 3 years 
Dinh Dang Dinh 6 years 3 years 
Phan Thanh Hai 4 years 2 years 
Pham Minh Hoang 3 years 1 years and 5 months 
  Source: The Committee to Protect Journalists. Retrieved November 5, 2014 from http://cpj.org/imprisoned 
According to table 5.3, up to one fourth of the imprisoned “journalists” has 
been released between 2010 and 2014. RSF’s methodology, which was upgraded 
in 2013, does not mention this. The violence score does not account for the reduc-
tion of prison sentences. Vietnam can expect to continue to receive a low score 
with this methodology. The cases above, moreover, except for Hoang Khuong, 
were bloggers, not journalists. In a country like Vietnam where few if any journal-
ists were arrested for valid journalism, RSF continued to give low scores for press 
freedom. The organization’s methodology apparently failed to produce accurate 
scores for press freedom.  
Although FH and RSF are regarded by some as the most trusted media 
watchdogs, it should be noticed that they are still unfair and have limitations on 
judging press freedom in particular countries such as Vietnam. FH also ignores 
the concept of a journalist. It regards bloggers in Vietnam who attempt to over-
throw the government or spread anti-government propaganda as journalists. FH 
also criticizes Vietnam’s Press Law and Vietnam’s Penal Code despite the fact 
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that all the laws are made in accordance to the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political rights as well as US law, its initial inspiration. Sharing the same no-
tion, RSF started its bias against Vietnam by ignoring the distinction between 
journalists and bloggers. According to its methodology, bloggers are regarded as 
journalists if they have their writing posted online. According to Vietnamese 
Press Law, on the other hand, a writer is recognized as an official journalist if he 
or she works for a legal newspaper or magazine for at least 5 years. RSF has ex-
posed its one-sidedness and inaccuracy in judging press freedom in Vietnam. De-
spite the biases of RSF and FH, Vietnam cannot be said to have a completely free 
press. It is necessary to wait for an appropriate and objective report on press free-
dom from an independent organization. 
5.3.3. Real situation of press freedom in Vietnam 
This thesis is unable to assess the level of press freedom in Vietnam. It at-
tempts to point out some of the developments of press freedom in the country. As 
a Vietnamese journalist, I personally assert that I can write and publish freely and 
am enjoying the country’s press freedom. I have seen the development of a more 
favorable environment for journalistic activities myself and through my contacts 
in the industry. Vietnam has witnessed the rapid development of its media in re-
cent years, particularly after it joined the World Trade Organization. In 2004, 
about 85 per cent of the population watched TV, viewing just five official chan-
nels, which included VTV1 (news and political reports), VTV2 (science and edu-
cation), VTV3 (sport, culture, the economy and entertainment), VTV4 (foreign di-
plomacy and programs for Vietnamese overseas), and VTV5 (programs for ethnic 
minority groups). Now, more than 100 TV channels are broadcast, providing 
nearly 100 per cent of the population with information and live images from all 
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over the world (Gallup, 2013). The broadcast journalism industry has experienced 
significant progress, employs thousands of reporters, and allows viewers to have 
more choices than ever before. 
Print journalism has similarly explained. In 2005, there were nearly 600 
newsrooms with more than 700 newspapers and magazines (The Prime Minister, 
2005). Fifty news newspapers were published (Truong, 2005). To further ensure 
variety of print and news-only media in general, a governmental decision was is-
sued in 2005 to boost the development of the Vietnamese press or print media. 
The 2014 report issued by the Ministry of Information and Communications 
showed that during the past eight years between 2006 and 2014, nearly 240 new 
TV stations and newsrooms have come into operation, raising the total to 840. 
More than 410 new print and electronic outlets have been established, raising the 
total to more than 1,110 (Ministry of Information and Communications, 2014). 
Among them, an increasing number of news websites has reinforced this rapid 
media development by making up nearly one fourth of the total of media outlets, 
at 305. An increase in the number of media publications also means that the coun-
try has seen dramatic growth in the number of journalists and reporters. In 2005, 
there were approximately 25,000 Vietnamese journalists and reporters working at 
home and abroad, and this figure has nearly doubled in 2014, with more than 
40,000, a 37.5 per cent increase (Ha, 2014). Among these, about 18000 journalists 
have been issued with press certificates, which means that they have had more 
than 5 years working experience. Based on the large number of print publications, 
television and radio channels and news websites, as well as journalists and report-
ers, it can hardly be denied that there is at least some freedom of the press of Vi-
etnam.  
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The state-owned news agencies have become financially independent from 
the state following governmental degree No. 43 in 2006, which declares that the 
state no longer provides state-owned newsrooms and television stations with fi-
nancial support (Ha, 2014). More new media companies and newspapers have 
been founded as they find freedom in the media market. It is likely that more me-
dia outlets looking for market share will bring about greater competition. To at-
tract readers and advertising contracts, they will improve the content of newspa-
pers, magazines and TV channels. If their media products do not achieve a certain 
quality, or are not trustworthy, they will likely suffer from lower circulation and a 
subsequent loss of advertising contracts.  
This focus on public interest and accuracy in reporting instead of state prop-
aganda, should solve many of the problems in the media sector. Additionally, me-
dia groups have begun searching for more experienced reporters and journalists as 
well as providing improved training for new and young reporters in order to im-
prove their performance. As a likely result, in 2011 the total advertising revenue 
of mass media hit VND4.2 trillion (US$200 million) (“Toàn Văn Báo cáo”, 
2011). The income from the press advertising kept increasing in 2012, with just 
below VND18 trillion (US$857 million). In the first six months of the year 2013, 
financial gains recorded by the press were at VND11 trillion (US$523 million). 
This helps Vietnam’s print media attract more journalists and improve their prod-
ucts year by year.    
The open-door policy for the restructure and enhancement of media content 
and improvement of journalists’ performances also allows journalists to take a 
piecemeal approach on sensitive issues such as corruption or bribery. I myself 
have written more than 20 news stories and longer articles on corruption for Viet 
Nam News newspaper between 2012-2013. According to U4 Expert Answer 
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(Martini & Transparency International, 2012), the press has a significant role in 
combating corruption as it has been regarded as the second most reliable body in 
steering the campaign against corruption by the TI and Global Corruption Barom-
eter (GCB). The press has been significant in reporting and investigating many of 
the major as well as minor corruption cases in Vietnam. The significant role of the 
press in this area can be seen in the major corruption case involving governmental 
leaders working at PMU 18 in early 2006. According to a press investigation, 
governmental leaders including former deputy transport minister Nguyen Viet 
Tien, former Transport minister Dao Dinh Binh and former Executive Director of 
the PMU 18 unit Bui Tien Dung were guilty of corrupt practices. However, 
charges against the former transport and deputy transport ministers were finally 
dismissed by the Supreme Court. It can be seen that despite its exposure of the 
PMU 18 corruption case, the press did not have sufficient power to pressure au-
thorities to try top politicians. It was not until 2010, that additional major corrup-
tion scandals were effectively revealed by the press.   
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Chapter 6: More press freedom, more corruption scandals 
revealed 
Hypothesis 4: Higher levels of press freedom explain an increase in the number of 
corruption scandals. 
This chapter analyzes the negative impacts of press freedom on corruption 
scandals based on a range of research. Five key corruption scandals have been re-
ported since 2010 by Vietnam's press, and these will be examined to illustrate the 
point that democratization in Vietnam coincided with the breaking of corruption 
scandals and their investigation by the domestic media. 
6.1. Impacts of press freedom on corruption 
Press freedom is a vital element of a democratic regime. Press freedom, in 
turn, has a negative impact on corruption. Stapenhurst (2000) divides the impact 
of media on corruption into two categories, “tangible” and “intangible”. In the 
tangible category, corruption is tackled through news stories or series of stories 
about corruption. However, an example of media impact on corruption is listed in 
the intangible category, when the public, accountable politicians, public bodies 
and news media all criticize corruption and call for checks on this activity. Bru-
netti and Weder (2003) argue that the occurrence of corruption is explained by 
three factors, internal control, external control and indirect control. Among them, 
press freedom is an instrument of external control over corruption. According to 
Brunetti and Weder (2003), external control is defined as a system of checks and 
balances which includes the judiciary and watchdog agencies. Other organizations 
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and bodies might perform the same role if checks and balances are less developed 
(Ades and Di Tella, 1999). For that reason, press freedom is seen as a tool of 
checks and balances which can work effectively against corruption. Rose-Acker-
man (1999) contends that press freedom creates a favorable environment for me-
dia agencies to weigh in against the wrongdoings of politicians, bureaucrats and 
even governments. 
Corrupt behavior is more likely to be uncovered by media outlets, which 
also may receive tip-offs on such corrupt behavior from the public. Revelations 
about allegations of corruption can force internal control mechanisms (in the ad-
ministrative environment) over corruption or external control mechanisms (the ju-
diciary) to be more effective in detecting and punishing corrupt bureaucrats. 
Moreover, Brunetti and Weder (2003) assert that collusive corruption can be tack-
led by press freedom, which provides journalists with the right to investigate any 
misconduct. According to them, it is hard to detect collusive corruption if internal 
control mechanisms belong to a corrupt network, or if journalists are themselves 
part of corruption rings. However, the benefits gained from corruption cannot lure 
all journalists if press freedom is maintained. Journalists simply have more incen-
tive to expose corruption to the wider public.  
It may be concluded that press freedom contributes to reducing levels of 
corruption in democratic countries. In a democratizing country, where corruption 
is said to keep increasing until democracy is consolidated, will press freedom be 
promoted, and will it be able to affect the perception levels of corruption? 
Based on the arguments made by Brunetti and Weder (2003), there should 
be an inverse relationship between press freedom and corruption. Their argument 
is partly supported by Bhattacharyya and Hodler (2012) and Adsera, Boix and 
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Payne (2003), who assert that corruption decreases if there is an increase in free-
dom of the press and a high quality democratic regime. They explain that media 
freedom only offers reporting on corruption that helps democratic institutions 
curb corrupt behavior. Agreeing with Brunetti and Weder, Chowhudry (2004) 
states that press freedom and democracy tend to reduce corruption but do so sepa-
rately. Saha, Gounder and Su (2009) assume that press freedom is an appropriate 
means for curbing corruption, based on the interaction between economic freedom 
and press freedom. 
Brunetti and Weder’s argument seems to apply when we examine TI’s Cor-
ruption Perception Index and FH’s Index. According to these, countries with press 
freedom are normally seen to have low levels of perceived corruption. For in-
stance, New Zealand ranks 1st on TI’s 2013 Corruption Perceptions Index, Ger-
many and Canada rank 9th on TI’s 2013 Corruption Perceptions Index are demo-
cratic regimes that have high levels of press freedom. However, the inverse rela-
tionship between press freedom and corruption, according to Rose Ackerman 
(1999), does not exist in poor countries, with substantial levels of illiteracy. Cor-
ruption in such countries cannot be easily curbed even if the media plays an active 
role in fighting it. 
6.2. Key corruption scandals reported by the Vietnamese press 
Vietnam’s open-door policy for the restructuring and enhancement of news 
media content also allows journalists to tackle socially sensitive issues such as 
corruption and bribery in a piecemeal manner. According to Martini and Trans-
parency International (2012), the press has a big role in combating corruption be-
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cause it is regarded as the second-most reliable body in campaigns against corrup-
tion, as noted by TI and GCB. The press has been in charge of reporting on many 
large and small corruption cases.  
The role of the press was increased significantly after journalists investi-
gated the PMU 18 corruption case that involved several high-profile politicians 
and individuals in 2006 (“WB Đánh Giá Cao”, 2006). Government leaders, in-
cluding former deputy transport minister Nguyen Viet Tien, former Transport 
minister Dao Dinh Binh and former Executive Director of PMU 18 Bui Tien 
Dung, were accused of corruption and potentially faced lengthy jail terms for 
these alleged crimes (Minh, 2007). However, charges against these officials, ex-
cept for Nguyen Viet Tien, were dismissed by the Supreme Court in 2008 (Khue, 
2008). Moreover, two journalists who reported extensively on the issue were im-
prisoned after the court ruled that they had produced inaccurate reports on the 
case and abused press freedom for personal gain. Despite its exposure of the PMU 
18 corruption scandal, the press after that did not investigate any other corruption 
scandals involving high-ranking officials, and had no power to pressure authori-
ties to impose the appropriate punishment for high ranking corrupt officials, until 
2010.  
6.2.1. Corruption scandal at Agribank Financial Leasing Company No.2 
Vu Quoc Hao, former general director of Agribank Financial Leasing Com-
pany No.2 (ALCII), a member of the state-owned Viet Nam Bank for Agriculture 
and Rural Development, and another 10 people were arrested in 2011 after they 
were reported to have caused losses of VND531 billion (US$25.3 million) and 
misappropriation of VND80 billion (US$3.8 million) (Quang & Khuong, 2011; 
Quyet, 2013). Local newspapers revealed that Hao made use of his own private 
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company (Cat Long Hai) to buy a second-hand vessel from Hai Phong Customs 
Bureau at VND100 million (US$4,700) in 2003; he had allegedly then sold it to 
ALCII for VND130 billion ($6.1 million) in 2007 (“Three Men Sentenced”, 
2014). According to Viet Nam News, to conduct the transaction, Hai colluded with 
10 other people working at Cat Long Hai and ALCII (“Three Men Sentenced”, 
2014). The other losses concerned illegal loans worth VND795.2 billion (US$37 
million), although part of the loans had been retrieved by ALCII. In 2013, Vu 
Quoc Hao and his partners, Pham Minh Tuan and Hoang Loc, were tried and sen-
tenced to death while Nguyen Van Tai, former general director of ALCII, Vu Duc 
Hoa, former director of Cat Long Hai JSC, Le Thi Minh Hue and Le Phuc Duc, 
former head of the evaluation section of Viet Nam Assessment JSC, were tried 
and sentenced to life in prison (“Three Men Sentenced”, 2014). 
The most popular newspapers and news websites in Vietnam, including Lao 
Dong, Tuoi Tre, Thanh Nien, Vnexpress, Vietnamnet and Vietnamplus each fea-
tured a series of investigative articles and news on this case between November 
2013 and September 2014. This was the period following the investigation by the 
Ministry of Public Security, and up until the accused were brought to court. Lao 
Dong published 21 articles (LaoDong, n.d.), Tuoi Tre 26 (Tuoitre, n.d.) and Vnex-
press 22 (Vnexpress, n.d.b). Coupled with other newspapers and website articles, 
hundreds of stories about this corruption scandal were published and broadcast. 
6.2.2 The corruption scandal at the Vietnam Shipbuilding Industry Group 
The Vietnam Shipbuilding Industry Group (Vinashin), a state-owned com-
pany, established in January, 1996, was the biggest company in Vietnam’s ship-
building industry (VOER, n.d.). In 2006, Vinashin became a national shipbuilding 
conglomerate after the PM’s decision in May 2006 (VOER, n.d.). Accordingly, 
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Vinashin consists of 15 other state companies. In 2009, the total value of the Vi-
nashin’s assets were VND92.6 trillion (US$440 million) (Lan, 2010). However, 
total debt stood at VND86.7 trillion (US$41 million) (Phuong, 2013). After inves-
tigations made by the Ministry of Public Security and by journalists, corrupt activ-
ities were revealed relating to two projects of Ben Thuy Shipyard in the central 
province of Ha Tinh and Dung Quat Shipyard in Quang Ngai Province, along 
with the misuse of VND300 million (US$14 million) (PV, 2011). Local newspa-
pers cited the Government Inspectorate’s conclusion affirming that the losses of 
VND86.7 trillion (US$4.1 billion) were primarily caused by the three corruption 
cases (PV, 2011). Nine high-profile officials were arrested in 2010, tried and sen-
tenced to prison in 2012. Former chairman of Vinashin, Pham Thanh Binh, was 
tried and sentenced to 20 years in prison and compelled to pay VND555 billion 
(US$26 million) (SGGP, 2012). Tran Quang Vu, former vice chairman of Vi-
nashin, was convicted and sentenced to 11 years in prison and required to pay 
VND1 billion (US$0.5 million) (SGGP, 2012). Although Vinashin was said to be 
involved in three corruption cases, the nine high-profile leaders were accused not 
of corruption, but of intentionally acting against the state’s economic management 
regulations and causing serious consequences.  
Local newspapers between March and August of the year 2012 featured ex-
tensive reporting on this case and published exhaustive investigations into the 
wrongdoings of Binh and his comrades. Papers and websites had an average of 
ten to fifteen articles, each focusing on this issue. For example, Vnexpress pub-
lished 20 articles about the story (Vnexpress, n.d.b).  
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6.2.3. Corruption scandals at Vietnam National Shipping Lines 
Vietnam National Shipping Lines (Vinalines) is another state conglomerate, 
founded in 1995 (Vinalines, 2013). According to the local press, Vinalines cur-
rently suffers from debts of more than VND11 trillion (US$523 million) (Linh, 
2014). The massive debts stemmed from mismanagement by Vinalines leaders 
and the losses suffered by Vinalines’ subsidiaries. The local press reported that 
Duong Tri Dung, former chairman of Vinalines, decided to build a ship repairing 
factory in the southern province Ba Ria-Vung Tau after former deputy PM Ngu-
yen Sinh Hung signed a document saying that “the government supported the 
Vinalines project to set up a southern ship repairing plant,” and the proposal “will 
be determined by the PM” (“Vinalines Ex-officials Indicted”, 2013, para. 5). Ap-
proximately VND6.5 trillion (US$309 million) was said to have been spent to 
build the shipyard in 2008, although Dung intended to spend only VND3.8 trillion 
(US$180 million) for the construction of the plant in 2007 (“Vinalines Ex-offi-
cials Indicted”, 2013). In addition, around US$24.3 million was reported to have 
been paid to buy a floating dock (“Vinalines Ex-officials Indicted”, 2013). The 
court decided to imprison nine officials from Vinalines in 2012. Among them, 
Duong Tri Dung, who had recently been promoted to be the director of the minis-
try’s Marine Department in February of 2012, was convicted (Anh & Dung, 
2012). Dung was tried and sentenced to death after he was accused of corrupt ac-
tivities and intentionally violating state regulations on economic management, 
causing serious consequences (“Vinalines Ex-officials Indicted”, 2013). 
The role of the press in the Vinalines case is very clear. The local press indi-
cated that the PM had taken responsibility for the Vinalines’ corruption scandal. 
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Moreover, the local press succeeded in releasing details on the two cost values for 
constructing the shipyard. Local journalists detailed the huge sums of money that 
were pocketed, highlighting the huge gap between the cost of building the ship-
yard and the actual money that had been spent on the project (“Vinalines Ex-offi-
cials Indicted”, 2013). The significant difference between VND3.8 trillion 
(US$180 million) and VND6.5 trillion (US$309 million) caused readers to think 
about the costs of corruption. The press also highlighted the large loss of money 
spent on a broken, secondhand, floating dock. According to Vinalines’ 2007 esti-
mate, about US$14 million was needed for purchase and delivery of the dock 
from Russia (“Vietnam Shipping Firm”, 2014). However, a Vinalines 2008 report 
noted that the total cost for buying and shipping the floating dock was US$24.3 
million. Newspapers such as Tuoi Tre had journalists delving into the way 
Vinalines leaders benefitted from a deal that saw them seemingly buy the floating 
dock for $9 million even though the owner asked for only $5 million (“Vietnam 
Shipping Firm”, 2014). The newspapers reported that the dock broker AP then 
transferred US$1.66 million to Dung and his partners. Accordingly, Dung and 
Mai Xuan Phuc, former Vinalines general director, received VND10 billion each 
($470,000) (“Vinalines Ex-officials Indicted”, 2013). In 2013, Duong Tri and Mai 
Van Phuc Dung were convicted and sentenced to death while the other defendants 
were given 6 to 30 year prison sentences (“Ex-Vinalines Chiefs Sentenced”, 
2013). 
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Table 6.1: Defendants in Vinalines’ Corruption Scandal 
 
Names of defendants Position Years in prison/ 
Death Penalty 
Fines 
Duong Chi Dung Former Vinalines 
Chairman/ Former 
Director of the Min-
istry’s Marine De-
partment 
Death Penalty US$5.2 million 
Mai Van Phuc General Director of 
Vinalines 
Death Penalty US$5.2 million 
Tran Huu Chieu Former deputy gen-
eral director of 
Vinalines 
19 years US$1.9 million 
Tran Hai Son Director of Vinalines 
Ship repair Co. Ltd 
(A subsidiary of 
Vinalines) 
22 years US$2.2 million 
Huynh Huu Duc Former official of the 
Van Phong Customs 
Office 
8 years US$330,000 
Le Van Lung Former official of the 
Van Phong Customs 
Office 
8 years US$285,000 
Le Ngoc Trien Former official of the 
Van Phong Customs 
Office 
8 years US$285,000 
Mai Van Khang Former member of 
Vinalines project 
management board 
7 years  
Le Van Duong Former official at 
Vietnam Registry 
7 years  
Bui Thi Bich Loan Former chief ac-
countant of Vinalines 
4 years  
   Source: Viet Nam News. Retrieved August 9, 2014 from http://vietnamnews.vn/society/249028/ex-
vinalines-chiefs-sentenced-to-death.html 
 
6.2.4. Banking scandal involving corrupt tycoon and former minister 
The year 2012 included the biggest of the corruption scandals involving 
well-known Vietnamese tycoon Nguyen Duc Kien. Kien, described as a person 
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enjoying a close relationship with PM Nguyen Tan Dung (“Vietnam Soccer Ty-
coon”, 2014), was said to have great influence over both the Asia Commercial 
Bank (ACB) and Vietnam Professional Football companies, where Kien was the 
founder (Hung, 2014). However, Kien was arrested in 2012 after he was accused 
of being corrupt, avoiding tax and illegally appropriating ACB’s property (Dao, 
2013). According to the People’s Police newspaper, Kien withdrew from the 
ACB’s management board in 2008 after he succeeded in establishing a new man-
agement system at the bank that allowed him to remain in control (“ACB's Kien 
Manipulated”, 2013). That system not only allowed Kien to take advantage of 
loopholes in Vietnamese laws for his personal gain but also helped prevent 
charges being made against him over the period between 2005 and 2012. (Khanh, 
2013). His alleged crimes of corruption are as follows: 
1) He was accused of abusing his power for personal gain. He ordered 19 
staff members of the ACB to loan Vietinbank VND719 billion (US$34 million) 
(Son, 2014). Under the contract, the interest of the loan was 14 per cent per year 
(Son, 2014). However, Vietinbank had to pay him an additional 3 to 14 percent 
additional interest rate per year as Kien signed a tacit agreement on the extra inter-
est (Son, 2014). Sending deposit money to other banks is illegal in Vietnam. 
Moreover, the ceiling level of the interest rate during 2011 was 14 per cent (Son, 
2011). 
2) Kien was also convicted of fraudulently appropriating ACB property 
worth up to VND264 billion (US$12.5 million) in 2014 (Dung, 2014). It should 
be noted that Kien was the owner of 6 private companies. Among them, Hanoi In-
vestment Joint Stock Company (ACBI) owned 30 million shares bought from Hoa 
Phat Steel Company (Dao, 2013). In 2010, ACBI sold bonds worth VND800 bil-
lion (US$38 million) to the ACB and mortgaged 22.4 million shares purchased 
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from Hoa Phat Steel Company (Dao, 2013). ACBI decided to resell 20 million 
shares in Hoa Phat in 2012 to Hoa Phat Steel Company despite the fact that ACBI 
had not paid off the mortgage. (Duy, 2014). Regarding the case, Tran Xuan Gia, 
who was the Minister of Planning and Investment from 1996 to 2002, was also 
found to be involved after he was accused of violating State regulations on eco-
nomic management leading to serious consequences (“Police Probe Ex-minister”, 
2013). Gia had approved the loan worth US$34 million. 
In this case, Vietnamese journalists succeeded in providing their readers 
with an in-depth look at the tycoon’s wrongdoing, showing that he violated the 
Vietnamese regulations on currency and had illegally appropriated the ACB’s 
property. Second, Kien caused a huge corruption scandal. For those journalists, 
Kien abused his power for private gain. It was also revealed how Kien took ad-
vantage of his position as a founder of the ACB to set up a system that allowed 
him to manipulate the system (“Police Probe Ex-minister”, 2013). It was a clever 
scam that allowed a retired deputy chairman like Kien to retain influence over the 
decisions of the management board of the ACB. That explains why the ACB staff 
members under Kien’s command gave Vietinbank the US$34 million loan at an 
illegally high interest rate. Also, local journalists showed the connection between 
Kien’s companies and the ACB by describing many of the transactions carried out 
by Kien’s companies and the ACB.  In addition, they described the loopholes in 
Vietnam’s laws in detail, and criticized the adjudicator in the corruption case 
against Nguyen Duc Kien.  
6.2.5. The corruption scandal at the state-owned VietinBank 
About VND4.9 trillion (US$233 million) was misappropriated by Huynh 
Thi Huyen Nhu, who had been the head of a Vietinbank transaction office in 
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HCM City (Duyen, 2013). It has been described as the biggest financial scandal in 
Vietnamese history, with 23 defendants taken to court. Part of the case is directly 
related to corruption (Viet, 2013). Five commercial banks and securities compa-
nies, including Phuong Dong Securities Company, Hung Yen Company, Saigon-
bank Berjaya Securities Company, Global Insurance Company and An Loc Com-
pany, sent VND1,000 billion (US$47.6 million) to their VietinBank accounts 
(Dung, 2014). By ordering her staff to validate her fake signatures and bypass 
banking processes, Nhu was reported to have embezzled a huge amount of money 
(Di, 2014). Moreover, Nhu created 83 bogus bank accounts and then took out a 
loan of VND514 billion (US$24.5 million) at two VietinBank branches in Ho Chi 
Minh City (Di, 2014). Nhu and other defendants were only convicted of decep-
tion, acting against the state’s economic management regulations and causing se-
rious consequences (M.H, 2014). The minor character of their indictments was 
unexpected given that all of the defendants were senior banking officials working 
at VietinBank branches in HCM City. They included Tran Thanh Nguyen, former 
head of credit; Tran Thanh Thanh, former head of transactions and Bui Ngoc 
Quyen, deputy head of transactions.  
Vietnamese journalists reinforced their key role in fighting corruption by in-
vestigating the financial scandal relating to state-owned and commercial banks. At 
first, 7 commercial and securities companies were reported to have transfered up 
to VND2000 billion (US$95.3 million) to VietinBank. Nhu and her partners were 
reported to have embezzled all of these transfers. During the first trial, Nhu was 
indicted on charges of fraud, while the other defendants were charged with acting 
against the state’s economic management regulations, and causing serious conse-
quences. Those charges, in particular, meant that VietinBank would have no re-
sponsibility to return the money. However, the court decided to drop some of the 
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charges against Nhu and her partners, even though the press provided additional 
evidence to their allegations that Nhu and her partners were all involved in cor-
ruption (M.H, 2014). According to the HCM City supreme court, Nhu will have to 
serve a life sentence for embezzling VND1000 billion (US$47 million) from the 7 
banks and companies. Nhu and her partners might also receive additional punish-
ment regarding the other half of the amount of money. If Nhu and the other de-
fendants are found to be corrupt, Nhu and others might yet receive a death penalty 
at a subsequent trial. Moreover, VietinBank will have to pay back US$47 million.  
6.3. Higher levels of press freedom explain an increase in the number 
of corruption scandals 
According to Stapenhurst (2000), if the public, politicians, state bodies and 
news media work together to fight corruption, thereby provide and require checks 
on corruption, free media then also have an intangible impact on corruption. As 
Brunetti and Weder (2003) assert, the principal check on corruption is press free-
dom. Press freedom allows media outlets and journalists to put the spotlight on 
cases of corruption. Press freedom strengthens the role of the judiciary and other 
relevant organs. It urges them to be more effective in detecting and punishing cor-
rupt individuals. In the five mentioned corruption scandals, the press has played a 
key role. In the corruption case at ALCII, the press examined the losses of VND3 
trillion (US$142 million), and effectively pressured the Ministry of Public Secu-
rity to conduct an investigation that found the general director and 10 other de-
fendants to have been involved in corruption (Viet, 2011; Chau, 2014). In the Vi-
nashin corruption scandal, the press reported losses of VND5 trillion (US238 mil-
lion) (Ky, 2011) due to corruption. Some journalists’ stories even indicated that 
the losses of Vinashin were a consequence of a decision made by the PM. Thus, 
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the press, at least to a certain degree, put pressure on the PM to acknowledge his 
mistakes and give an apology to the public (Minh, 2012). In the case of Vinalines, 
the press directed the attention of the Ministry of Public Security to a report ex-
posing losses of VND1.7 trillion (US$81 million) made by Vinalines in 2009 and 
2010 and unreasonable spending on the purchase of 73 old vessels (Nguyen, 
2012). The report helped to motivate the Ministry of Public Security to start its 
campaign against corruption at Vinalines. They soon found that significant ex-
penses of its shipyard as well as the purchase of a floating dock were illegal. 
Based on the evidence provided by the police, the press described the sudden in-
crease in the cost of building a factory uncovered the cost of the floating dock be-
fore and after it was sold to Vinalines. The judiciary ultimately punished the di-
rector of the Ministry’s Marine Department Duong Chi Dung. He was tried and 
sentenced to death. It should be noted that it was the first time that a high-profile 
official received the death penalty since the CVP came to power in Vietnam. The 
press also raised many sensitive questions, such as who had promoted Dung to the 
head of the Marine Department when Vinalines was suffering from huge losses. 
This indicated that the PM was ultimately responsibile for the losses at Vinalines. 
In the fourth case, the press provided a comprehensive account of corruption by a 
well-known tycoon, Le Duc Kien. Although the judiciary regards Kien as simply 
an economic criminal, some local newspapers continue to regard him as a corrupt 
tycoon who takes advantage of loopholes in the law to enrich himself. The media 
published a series of articles that argued that Kien abused his power to earn 
money by commanding ACB staff to engage in illegal banking deals. However, 
Kien’s crimes were only regarded as fraudulent misappropriation by the judiciary. 
In the last case, much of the local press argued that high-ranking banking official 
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Huynh Thi Huyen Nhu was corrupt after detailing information about how Nhu 
had amassed a personal fortune, estimated at US$6.5 million. 
A free media, according to political scientists and media theorists, is a key 
instrument of journalists that allows them to access and expose information. 
These observers also agree that a free media plays a vital role in promoting de-
mocracy in democratizing countries, as well as establishing democratic regimes in 
non-democratic states by improving checks and balances, providing people with 
useful and available information and promoting public discussion on important is-
sues. It is not difficult to see the role of the free press in a democratizing country 
like Vietnam.  
Is Vietnam democratizing after 2010? Its growing press freedom, judgments 
by FH, RSF to the contrary notwithstanding, points to a significant movement in 
that direction. The answer then, is yes, it is democratizing, despite organizations 
such as RSF or FH insisting that there is no press freedom in Vietnam. However, 
it can be argued that a free press does exist in Vietnam, thanks to the rapid devel-
opment of the media industry, fast growth in the number of journalists, growing 
financial independence of newspapers from the state and the discussions of sensi-
tive topics, especially the denunciation of corruption by the press. Vietnam, in this 
key indicator, is very much on the path to democratization. 
Five corruption scandals have been investigated and reported by Vietnam-
ese journalists within 4 years. Meanwhile, it should be noted that there were only 
two corruption scandals revealed from 1987 to 2010. In doing so, the press has 
published many in-depth articles and commentaries that have allowed citizens to 
raise their concerns over the issue. The press has also had a gradual impact on the 
judiciary, assisting it to make fair and deliberate decisions. The free press, during 
the period, has also started to criticize high-ranking leaders, and has even forced 
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the judiciary to imprison high-profile officials who were allegedly corrupt (for ex-
ample, Director of the Marine Department, Duong Tri Dung). It can be seen that 
Vietnam is now enjoying press freedom and the fruits that a free press brings in 
fighting corruption. Regarding the fourth hypothesis, it may be concluded that the 
higher levels of press freedom brought about by more democratization leads to a 
greater incidence of perceived corruption scandals in Vietnam. 
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CHAPTER 7: Conclusion 
Vietnam has experienced significant changes in its politics, economy and 
society since 2010. There has been an internal rupture between political leaders, 
mitigation of oppression of political dissidents and an amplification of civil liber-
ties, especially in the period 2010 to 2014. As noted in previous chapters, a good 
deal of evidence emphasizes that Vietnam is, indeed, democratizing. The country 
has witnessed signals of liberalization, and part of the democratization process. 
The transition is leading to an increase in press freedom in the country. In the 
wake of this, a free press underscores the presence of corruption and highlights 
corruption scandals. The thesis starts with the first hypothesis that Vietnam is de-
mocratizing. Liberal democracy serves as the most common trend in the world to-
day, and is considered as an ideal regime among types of democracies. Scholars 
such as Rummel (1999) describe liberal democracy as a system with regular elec-
tions for the highest government positions, competitive political parties, secret 
ballots, civil liberties and political rights (human rights). Many scholars, including 
Schneider and Schmitter (2004), Diamond (1999), Linz and Stepan (1996) and 
O’Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead (1986) consider democratization as a three-
step process: liberalization of authoritarian systems, transition to democracy, and 
consolidation of democracy. O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986) affirm that liberali-
zation revolves around the mitigation of oppression and amplification of civil lib-
erties within an authoritarian regime. Fissures among members of an authoritarian 
regime are also considered signals of the emergence of liberalization (Kaufman, 
1986; O’Donnell & Schmitter, 1986; Chalmers & Robinson, 1982; Przeworski, 
 97 
1986). Vietnam contains all the features of this first step toward democracy. Ac-
cording to the criteria described by Schneider and Schmitter (2004), Diamond 
(1999), Linz and Stepan (1996) and O’Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead (1986), 
Vietnam can be said to be in the progress of democratization since 2010. Thayer 
(2009) also affirms that Vietnam is now engaged in political liberalization. Re-
garding the relationship between the democratization process and levels of per-
ceptions of corruption, Rock (2009) contends that during the democratization pro-
cess, a state will suffer from the greatest perceptions of corruption. 
The thesis explores the second hypothesis, that Vietnam is undergoing a de-
mocratization process that thereby increases levels of perceived corruption in the 
country. Sung (2004) asserts that government corruption is expected to be on the 
rise during the liberalization period. In particular, countries that have recently 
been freed from authoritarian or totalitarian regimes all tend to be affected by 
growing corruption and “money politics” (Moran, 2001). Mohtadi and Roe (2003) 
also claim that corruption is found in young democracies where checks and bal-
ances, transparency and institutional systems are weak. However, based on devel-
opments and statistics, the thesis finds that democratization in Vietnam reduces 
the levels of perceived corruption. This conclusion defies the assumptions of 
many observers who conclude that the levels of corruption are high in democratiz-
ing countries (Liz & Stepan, 1996; Johnston, 1999; Mohtadi & Roe 2003; Dahl, 
1971). The relationship between democratization and levels of perceived corrup-
tion in Vietnam is significantly different from that of other countries in a similar 
situation. 
The thesis also examines the third hypothesis, that democratization in Vi-
etnam leads to increased press freedom. McQuail (2000) affirms that a free media 
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possesses rights to spread news, information and viewpoints without being con-
trolled by the government. Also, the media should be able to approach policy de-
cision making while managing its own business. No political factors should hold 
sway over the media. Gurevitch and Blumler (1990), Schudson (1995), Randall 
(1998), Scammel and Semetko (2000), Norris (2006) agree that the media is re-
sponsible for supervising developments and changes in a democratizing setting, 
and shares accountability for the functioning of a democratic state and society 
(Gurevitch & Blumler, 1990; Schudson, 1995; Randall, 1998; Scammel & 
Semetko, 2000; Norris, 2006). According to Mughan and Gunther (2000), the me-
dia are one of the main factors in creating democratization. In liberalization, the 
media has more space to raise people’s voices as well as function as a useful 
channel for political ideas. Agreeing with the idea that a free media boosts democ-
racy, Jebril et al., (2013) affirm that a free media and the transition processes sup-
port each other. When the media has been liberalized, the democratization pro-
cesses and human development are promoted and entrenched because reporters 
can take advantage of the new press freedom to produce objective articles that 
help build transparent and accountable governance (Norris, 2009). 
The thesis reaches the final hypothesis, that higher levels of press freedom, 
brought about by more democratization, explain an increase in the number of re-
ported corruption scandals. In a democratic regime, press freedom ostensibly re-
duces corruption. Rose-Ackerman (1999) asserts that press freedom facilitates the 
denunciation by the media of wrongdoings of politicians, bureaucrats and even 
governments. The thesis finds that the press in Vietnam enjoys a free environment 
in a sector that is seeing rapid progress. The 2014 report issued by the Ministry of 
Information and Communications showed that in the past eight years, between 
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2006 and 2014, nearly 240 new TV stations and newsrooms have come into oper-
ation, raising the total to 840, and that more than 410 new print and electronic out-
lets have been created, raising the total to more than 1,110. State-owned news 
agencies have become financially independent from the government, and there are 
more mechanisms to allow journalists to do their work. The number of key cor-
ruption scandals reported by the Vietnamese press has increased in recent years. 
The thesis has estimated that democratization accompanying press freedom leads 
to a rise in the number of reported corruption scandals. 
Although the thesis reaches its main findings on the relationship of democ-
ratization, press freedom and corruption in Vietnam, as outlined, this argument 
still has limitations. For instance, it has yet to be concluded decisively that democ-
ratization accompanying press freedom can increase perceptions of corruption in 
Vietnam. Data necessary to make these determinations are simply not available. 
The reports of FH, RSF and the World Bank, moreover, are consistently mislead-
ing, as demonstrated in previous chapters. In the case of Vietnam, at least, they re-
main ideological products of the Cold War, and do not reflect the real situation of 
Vietnam as regard democracy and press freedom.  
Nevertheless, the weight of the evidence points to major changes in Vi-
etnam since 2010. The country does appear to be democratizing, and this process 
seems to be responsible for an unprecedented series of corruption scandals, a con-
dition that points to a positive future.  
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Luật sư nói về trách nhiệm của thủ tướng trong vụ Vinashin [Lawyers comment 
on responsibilities of the Prime Minister for losses at Vinashin]. (2010, 
Nov 23). BBCVietnam. Retrieved from http://www.bbc.com/vietnamese 
  
M.H (2014, Feb 14). Vụ Huyền Như: Mức án tòa tuyên là chưa phù hợp? [Huyen 
Nhu case: is the sentence too soft?], Doi Song Phap Luat Online. Re-
trieved from http://www.doisongphapluat.com 
  
Mainwaring, Scott. (1992). Transitions to democracy and democratic consolida-
tion: Theoretical and comparative issues. In Mainwaring, Scott, O'Don-
nell, Guillermo A, & Samuel Valenzuela. (eds). Issues in democratic con-
solidation: The New South American democracies in comparative per-
spective.  Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press. 
 
 110 
Mainwaring, S., Brinks, D., & Perez-Linan, A. (2001). Classifying political re-
gimes in Latin America, 1945–1999. Studies in Comparative International 
Development 36(1), 37-65. Retrieved from Academic Research Library 
database. 
  
Mainwaring, S., & O'Donnell, G. A. (1992). Issues in democratic consolidation: 
The new South American democracies in comparative perspective, Notre 
Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press. 
 
Marshall, M. G., & Cole, B. R. (2009). Global report 2009. Conflict, governance, 
and state fragility. Arlington, VA: The George Mason University, Center 
for Global Policy. 
 
Marshall, M. G., & Cole, B. R. (2011). Global report 2011. Conflict, governance, 
and state fragility. Arlington, VA: Center for Systemic Peace. 
  
Martini, M., & Transparency International (2012). Overview of corruption and 
anti-corruption in Vietnam. Bergen, Norway: U4 Anti-Corruption Re-
source Centre. Retrieved from http://www.u4.no/publications/overview-
of-corruption-and-anti-corruption-in-vietnam/ 
  
May, R. J., & Selochan, V. (2004). The military and democracy in Asia and the 
Pacific. Canberra, Australia: ANU E Press. 
 
McConnell, P. J., & B., Becker L. (2002). The role of the media in democratiza-
tion. Paper presented at the Political Communication Section of the Inter-
national Association for Media and Communication Research, Barcelona. 
 
McQuail, D. (1994). McQuail’s mass communication theory. London: Sage Publi-
cations. 
  
McQuail, D., (Ed.). (2000). McQuail’s mass communication theory. London: 
Sage Publications. 
 
Melville, A., Polunin, Y., IIyin, M., Mironyuk, M., Timofeev, I., Meleshkina, E., 
& Vaslavskiy, Y. (2010). Political atlas of the modern world. Singapore: 
Wiley-Blackwell. 
  
Merkel, W. (2004). Embedded and defective democracies. Democratization, 
11(5), 33–58. Retrieved from Academic Research Library database. 
  
Minh, G. (2012, Jan 2). Nhà báo Hoàng Khương bị bắt tạm giam [Journalist Ho-
ang Khuong is caught], Tuoitre. Retrieved from http://tuoitre.vn 
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quốc tế [Vietnam's opposition against China attracts international press at-
tention], Vnexpress. Retrieved from http://vnexpress.net 
  
Tanzi, V., & Davoodi, H.  (1997). Corruption, public investment, and growth (In-
ternational Monetary Fund Working Paper 97/139). Retrieved from 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/wp97139.pdf 
  
Tavares, C. S. (2007). Do rapid political and trade liberalizations increase corrup-
tion?  European Journal of Political Economy, 23,1053-1076. Retrieved 
from Academic Research Library database. 
 
Thạc sỹ Nguyễn Tiến Trung được trả tự do [MA Nguyen Tien Trung is released]. 
(2014, Apr 12). BBCVietnam. Retrieved from http://www.bbc.com/viet-
namese 
  
Thanh, T. (2013, May 16). Nguyễn Phương Uyên bị phạt 6 năm tù, Đinh Nguyên 
Kha 10 năm tù [Nguyen Phuong Uyen 6 years in prison and Dinh Nguyen 
Kha 10 years], Thanhnien. Retrieved from http://www.thanhnien.com.vn  
 
Thayer, C. A. (2009). Political Legitimacy of Vietnam’s One Party-State: Chal-
lenges and Responses. Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs, 28(4), 
47-70. Retrieved from Academic Research Library database. 
  
Thayer, C. A., City University of Hong Kong., & Southeast Asia Research Centre. 
(2012). The apparatus of authoritarian rule in Vietnam: SEARC. 
 
The Prime Minister. (2005). Approval for the strategy on information develop-
ment till 2010. (Decision no.219/2005/QD-TTg ). Hanoi, Vietnam: The 
Prime Minister. 
 
The World Bank. (n.d.). History. Retrieved from 
http://www.worldbank.org/en/about/history 
  
Thomas, M. A. (2010). What do the Worldwide Governance Indicators measure? 
European Journal of Development Research, 22(1), 31-54. Retrieved from 
Academic Research Library database. 
 
Three men sentenced to death in corruption scam. (2014, Sep 26). Viet Nam News. 
Retrieved from http://vietnamnews.vn 
  
 117 
Tin, H. (2013, June 11). Kết quả tín nhiệm phản ánh đúng tình hình đất nước [Re-
sult of confidence vote presents real situation in Vietnam], BaoDauTu. Re-
trieved from http://baodautu.vn 
 
Tin Tuc Kinh Te. (2012, June 8). Vinalines lỗ hay lãi? [ Vinalines: losses or bene-
fits?] [facebook update]. Retrieved from https://www.facebook.com/Tin-
TucKinhTe/posts/321652447915874. 
 
Toàn văn Báo cáo Đánh giá Công tác Báo chí 2011. [2011 Report on press in Vi-
etnam]. (2011, March 30). Vietnamplus. Retrieved from http://vietnam-
plus.vn 
 
Transparency International. (2012). Corruption Perceptions Index 2012.   Re-
trieved Nov 22, 2014, from http://www.transparency.org/cpi2012/results 
 
Transparency International. (2014). Vietnam’s Perception of Corruption [Table 
4.1]. Retrieved December 12, 2014 from http://www.transparency.org/re-
search/cpi 
  
Treisman, D. (2000). The causes of corruption: A cross-national study. Journal of 
Public Economics, 76(3), 399-457. Retrieved from Academic Research Li-
brary database. 
  
Trinh, D. (2014, Dec 29). “Mổ xẻ” đại án Huyền Như: Tính hợp pháp của hơn 
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highly values Vietnam's journalists for anti-corruption work]. (2006, May 
4). RFA. Retrieved from http://www.rfa.org  
  
 120 
Weber, M. (1970). Transitions to democracy: Toward a dynamic model. Compar-
ative Politics 2(2), 337-363. Retrieved from Academic Research Library 
database. 
 
Whitehead, L. (2002). Democratization: Theory and practice: Oxford University 
Press. 
 
William, P. (1970). Wars, plots and scandals in post-war France. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
Wolfenson, D. J. (1999, Nov 10). Voices of the poor. Washington Post, P. A39 
 
World Bank Group. (2009). Vietnam. Retrieved Oct 10, 2014, from 
http://www.enterprisesurveys.org/data/exploreeconomies/2009/vietnam 
 
Worldwide Governance Indicators. (2015). Vietnam’s Voice and Accountability: 
2004 – 2012 [Graph 3.1]. Retrieved from http://databank.worldbank.org 
 
Worldwide Governance Indicators. (n.d.). The Worldwide Governance Indicators 
project. Retrieved from http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/in-
dex.aspx - home 
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